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ABSTRACT 
James Anderson.  ENFORCING ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN A SOCIAL 
NETWORK. (Under the direction of Dr. Junhua Ding).  Department of Computer Science, May 
1, 2012. 
Social networks supply a means by which people can communicate with each other while 
allowing for ease in initiating interaction and expressions.  These systems of human 
collaboration may also be used to store and distribute information of a sensitive nature that must 
be secured against intrusions at all times.  Given the massive operation embodied by social 
networks, multiple methods have been developed that control the flow of information so that 
those with authorization can gain access.  Before allowing a social network to begin distributing 
its contents, a prudent prerequisite should be that the security protocols prevent unauthorized 
access. 
 Formal modeling and analysis of security properties, particularly those of Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC), in social networks is the main focus of this thesis.  A social network 
system and its security assurance mechanisms are modeled using the input language of Symbolic 
Model Verifier (SMV),  and the properties of the system are specified using computation tree 
temporal logic (CTL*). Those properties are then verified using the SMV model checker.  A real 
case was studied to demonstrate the effectiveness of model checking security properties in a 
social network system.  The case consists of an account in which a group of users share various 
resources and access privileges which are controlled by RBAC.  The case study results show that 
model checking is capable of formally analyzing security policies particularly RBAC in a social 
network system. In addition, the counter examples generated from model checking could help to 
create test cases for testing system implementation, and they can help us to find defects in the 
model as well.  Formally modeling and model checking security policies in a complex system, 
like a social network, can greatly improve the security of these systems. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Web-based social network (WBSN) systems provide a communication median by which 
people can develop personal relationships through digital interactions.  Each user creates an 
account that allows him or her to build a profile for creating and managing resources, such as 
blogs and picture albums, which can be viewed, altered, or commented upon by their fellow 
users in the system.  These compilations of writings and graphics can be stored onto a social 
network account with the assurance that a specific category of user, such as those with similar 
backgrounds or cultural tastes, can locate and view them.  
 The urge to develop many positive relationships with others have led social networking 
users to connect with as many people as possible and not screen the motives of people requesting 
to link with their profile. (Hogben et al., 2007)  Not all of the users are truly sincere in their 
desire for amicable relationships and are only interested in trying to exploit the information 
stored within social networks.  Profiles and their contents have become targets of opportunity 
that can be used for malicious purposes. 
 One possible means by which a victim‟s profile can become a source of illicit profit is 
called digital dossier aggregation, which is the act of having a profile‟s contents downloaded and 
stored for use by third parties. (Hogben et al., 2007)  This digital copy of the original profile can 
be a boon to those wishing to steal someone‟s identity or to commit fraud.  Another way in 
which the contents of a profile can be used for threatening its owner are techniques such as 
Content-based Image Retrieval (CBIR), in which the features depicted in images can be used to 
determine the location where it was taken. (Hogben et al., 2007)  CBIR can assist in allowing 
people, who wish to commit harm to a person, to discover the whereabouts of their targets. 
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Malicious users have also developed viruses and worms that can cause mayhem as soon 
as they are uploaded into a user profile.  These programs can execute commands while 
disguising themselves as the user and perform inappropriate behavior, such as sending vulgar 
messages and/or images to coworkers and employers.  Equally worse is when the rogue 
processes either steal or destroy the contents stored inside the profile. 
For social networking sites to convince users to operate within their systems, they must 
convince the users that whatever is uploaded into their accounts can only be access by those that 
are authorized to and that their data and privacy is never intruded upon.  To assuage these 
concerns various forms of security are implemented into these complex systems that will ensure 
that users will always be the sole controllers of the resources they upload. 
1.1 Defcon Policy of Networking Systems 
Complex information networks are not always used by a single organization, but are 
sometimes employed as a resource pool by multiple administrations.  To better provide for their 
staff, networks can be contained in one core location that will allow for other sites to access it.  A 
network can also be split into multiple partitions so that separate parts of an organization can 
access their allocated partition.(Migliavacc et al., 2010)The more domains that are incorporated 
into a system, each with their own methods of exchanging data, the harder it becomes to 
guarantee the integrity of the security policies.  As the number of components used increases for 
each system, the chances that one component may have a bug that does not follow the security 
specification increases as well.  Thus any, and all, information that is sent or within reach of this 
breach becomes accessible to unauthorized persons.  This problem is further compounded by the 
fact that each system may be built by different developers, and that each could interpret the 
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security policy incorrectly.  Thus while the developers of one domain of the networks believe it 
is complying with the required security specification, it is actually countermanding it and 
allowing for intrusions. 
  The most desired arrangement of a system is the integration of different client entities 
that “enables the free flow of information and promises better service” (Migliavacc et al., 2010) 
and thus inspiring a process that is less interfering in the acquisition of resources.  For software 
components of multi-domain systems to better align with each other, “they are often 
implemented as event-driven architectures, in which components, potentially belonging to 
different domains, must process and exchange data in the form of event messages.”(Migliavacc 
et al., 2010) Applications, such as those used by social networks, that share information between 
users with event messages must always follow the information handling policies.  “This flow of 
sensitive data is an open problem of how to encode and enforce such flow-based security policies 
in the context of multi-domain event-driven applications.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010) This 
complication stems from the imbalance between the “high-level policies governing the handling 
of confidential data and low-level technical enforcement mechanisms.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010) 
“Traditional event-based and message-oriented software assists in correcting this malady by 
having the developers themselves enforcing the security policies inside of their 
applications.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010) This task is handled by the creation of policy enforcement 
points (PEPs) inside all of the components that will verify that the validity of sensitive operations 
before execution of any command.  PEPs make use of access control policies to ensure that any 
data‟s movement does not compromise the system‟s security integrity.  “However, these low-
level mechanisms require the configuration of permissions at the lowest level of the system 
architecture.  Each component would be required to outline all its requirements for approved data 
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transfer and thus would be difficult to observe and police across a multi-domain 
environment.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010)It is possible to alleviate some of the burden by 
implementing constraints on permitted data flows by the applications themselves.  This method 
requires that “all domains must enforce the security policy uniformly across every domain by 
requiring all policy enforcement occur automatically when data flows across boundaries between 
components and domains and not perform tedious access control checks upon the whole scope of 
individual operations.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010)  An example of setting the system‟s allowed 
behavior is by implementing “an event-based middleware that enforces event flow security 
policy in distributed, multi-domain applications.”(Migliavacc et al., 2010)The flow policy, called 
DEFCon Policy Language (DPL), sets the constraints on permitted component to component 
transactions through the use of security labels that outline the specifications of the security 
requirements.  These labels will function as a set standard that all data flow must follow in order 
for components to send and receive the labeled data.  This will force the system, no matter how 
many domains are incorporated at startup or added later, will adhere universally to the security 
specification. 
1.2 Privacy Aware 
WBSNs allow for participants to use the system in order to “share and publish 
information in the forms of annotations, blogs, etc., for a variety of purposes.”(Carminati et al., 
2008) The information to be shared with a person is determined by the relationship they have 
with others inside the network, which can be specified by assigning a trust level to each other.  
“The availability of this huge amount of information within a WBSN is a cause of concern for 
both the privacy of its users and the confidentiality of their information.”(Carminati et al., 
2008)To handle these concerns, WBSN began to implement safeguards in which the users can 
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“decide whether their data, relationships, and resources should be public, accessible only by 
themselves, or by users with whom they have a direct relationship.”(Carminati et al., 
2008)However, this form of access control is deemed too restrictive towards the goal of secure 
information sharing and too simple to ensure that unauthorized persons never can access their 
data.  Desired model of “more flexible strategies, that allow a user to define his/her own rules, 
denoting the set of network participants authorized to access his/her resources and personal 
information.”(Carminati et al., 2008) 
The Privacy-aware strategy is one form of security enforcement of WBSN resources 
where a user must present proof, of their existing relationship, to the resource‟s owner before 
access is granted.  This version of client-side access control requires that the relationships 
established by WBSN users are not revealed during operation.  These relationships are further 
used in the WBSN‟s security by first cataloging the relationships into types, depths, and trust 
levels.  Afterwards, the relationships are “encoded through certificates and their protection 
requirements are expressed through a set of distribution rules, which basically state who can 
exploit a certificate for access control purposes.”(Carminati et al., 2008)  The relationship is kept 
hidden by having the certificate encrypted with a symmetric key that is only sent to users listed 
in the distribution rules contained within the certificate.  All certificates of the WBSN are stored 
and updated inside a secured central node which is trusted by all. Though more flexible than the 
earlier access control policy, there are a few weaknesses that can be exploited by malicious 
users.  The creation of central node seems logical when dealing with a small number of users.  
However, WBSN are massive and can contain millions of users and would require an almost 
unmanageable set of certificates for all the possible connections and relationships that may exist 
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inside of a system.  “This bottleneck of performance makes the central node vulnerable to a 
Denial of Service attack.”(Carminati et al., 2008) 
Another strategy, that does not use the central node to hold the certificates, allow for the 
WBSN to compensate for these shortcomings by having the users, in a collaborative effort, 
enforce security.  Each of the owners‟ resources would “regulate access only to users authorized 
by the owner.  Also, the owner interacts only with resources of those that satisfy his/her own 
distribution rules.”(Carminati et al., 2008)Afterwards, any requester can be easily seen as either 
approved or not by seeing it is possible for them to access the resource.  Therefore, every 
resource is aware of any relationships between all users and the distribution rules that must be 
followed.  A user‟s account will then only be invited to a collaboration of accounts if it satisfies 
all of the distribution rules of the whole group.  Incorporating other forms of security, such as 
encryption and signature techniques, to reveal falsified certificates will further assist in enforcing 
the distribution rules. 
While many of the methods described above can be used to enforce social network 
security specifications, they sometimes are not easily administered in reality.  The varying 
degree of technical acumen required for a person to operate these techniques may make them 
logistically unfeasible in real life scenarios.  An ideal form of verifying security protocol would 
be for a social network to use a method that does not require much technical ability of its 
supervisor while also being autonomous.  This thesis seeks to demonstrate that a social network 
site‟s access control specifications can be simulated and verified using model checking.  Model 
checking would allow for a system administrator to confirm if the security properties, such as 
requiring that the system adheres to role-based access control (RBAC), are followed inside of a 
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social network model and allow for the administrator to both locate and remedy any discovered 
errors. 
1.3 RBAC and its implementation in WBSN 
RBAC is frequently used as a median by which to control and restrict the actions of a 
system‟s users.  Access control decisions are based upon a user‟s assigned role.  This role 
commonly represents the position of the user in an organization‟s personal hierarchy and dictates 
what responsibilities the user will have.  Each role implemented will have a pre-specified set of 
permissions that determine what objects the user with the role may have access to and what 
commands they will be able to execute upon the object.  An additional benefit of RBAC is the 
ability to centrally control and maintain all of the existing access rights.  The system 
administrators can determine which specific roles all of the users should have, and can easily 
alter them at a later time should the need arise. 
While providing their communication services and applications, some WBSN are 
implemented with RBAC in order to prevent the unwanted disclosure of user information.  Users 
are able to set and control their own access control policies.  After the account holders have 
uploaded their materials, this process begins by the holders determining which roles of the 
system are allowed to interact with the stored resources.  The level of interaction can range from 
just knowing their existence on the accounts profile to being able to view, write comments, or 
even add further materials upon it.  Once the role-permission sets have been finalized, the owner 
of the account determines which users of the account should be given roles.  Afterwards 
whenever that user accesses the account, they are given the pre-specified role and thus use their 
granted permissions upon the resources. 
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The RBAC policy of a WBSN give the users total control of all materials stored onto the 
network in a manner that does not require interference or even oversight from an administrative 
body.  If implemented correctly, the administration can focus less on the security of the user to 
user interactions.  However, should the policy arrange within the WBSN prove to be inadequate, 
the private materials of the networks users‟ that was only meant to be seen by a privileged few 
may be received by others.  The possibility of such an occurrence requires no room for errors 
when setting the security specification.  Therefore, WBSN must have an efficient means of 
thoroughly testing that the RBAC policies are followed inside of the network. 
1.4 Model Checking 
 “Model Checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state reactive systems, 
such as sequential circuit designs and communication protocols.”(Clarke et al., 1992) The 
specifications to be tested are written in a propositional logic that can express system changes 
over a period of time, and the reactive system itself is modeled in the form of a state-transition 
diagram to better display these changes.  The process of determining if the representative model 
handles all of the specifications is done by searching through all possible states, and their 
transitions, then evaluating if they follow the desired model behavior. 
 One of the most advantageous features of model checking over other proof checkers is its 
ability for the procedure to be autonomous.  After a detailed model representation of a reactive 
system and its specifications are created, the model checker will run to completion and terminate 
with a true answer if the model‟s behavior does not violate any of the outlined specifications.  If, 
however, the model‟s behavior allows for a violation to occur, the model checker will output a 
trace of the model‟s states.  This trace will show in what state of the model the fault was allowed 
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to occur the thus shows why the specification was not satisfied.  These counterexamples will 
allow for the user to determine which components of the system, and relevant specification, is 
the source of the failure. 
 Although a user can create models of great size and complexity to represent systems, it is 
unfeasible to try to represent many of the realistic systems due to their immense proportions.  
One method available to the users is to fabricate their models based on the modular structure of 
their desired system.  In this way, the model can only consist of parts of the system that are vital 
to be correct in and during operation, and remove parts that have no need, or no requirement, to 
be represented in testing.  “The specifications of the system can then be decomposed into 
properties that describe the behavior of small parts of the whole system.”(Clarke et al., 1992) 
The model checker can then singularly determine if each separate part of the system handles 
their local specification requirements. If all of sections return true, then by default the complete 
system will satisfy the complete set of specifications. Another way to represent systems of large 
size is to focus on the data paths.  The symbolic model used to create the working model can be 
made to handle the system‟s nontrivial data manipulations, but at the cost of making the 
verification process very complex.  “This abstract approach is based on the observation that the 
specifications of systems that include data paths usually involve fairly simple relationships 
among the data values in the system.”(Clarke et al., 1992)  One such example is that one 
component in a circuit must output a value greater than the output of three specific components 
after some period of time.  The abstraction curtails mapping all possible data values of the 
system‟s parts in exchange of only working with a small set abstract data values.  If collaborated 
with a states and transitions graph an abstract model of the system can be fabricated that would 
be both much smaller than the original model and easier to verify properties with. 
 10 
 
 Given the immense size of WBSNs and the complex security policies implemented 
within them, determining whether the system‟s RBAC properties are fully followed can be an 
onerous task.  Model checking can fulfill this niche by creating a formal model that represents all 
parts of the network that must follow RBAC.  The RBAC policies can then be then be added in 
the form of a meaningful logic specification that will be used to determine if the model is able to 
violate them.  Model checking can determine whether the existing RBAC policy of the WBSN is 
adequate in ensuring that only authorized users can access the networks contents.  Should a 
deficiency exist, the model checker will demonstrate how the trespassing user was able to 
interact with an object the system should have restricted from them.  Counterexamples will 
report which system variables allowed the user to circumvent the failed RBAC policy and help 
determine how best to update the network and/or the access control policies for an effective 
security strategy. 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
 This thesis explores the use of model checking in determining if a WBSN‟s RBAC 
policies are properly followed within the network.  The process begins by building a formal 
model of the WBSN along with a set of specification representing its RBAC policies.  The model 
checker will then analyze the system‟s behavior to determine if it is possible for the access 
control to be bypassed, and if so then determine which access control rule and component 
compromised the security enforcement. 
 In this work, a model of a custom social network is built to represent the proposed design 
of a company needed WBSN.  This model represents not only the sharing of resources common 
in WBSN, but also the RBAC that is also implemented within it.  The model is then sent as input 
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to the model checker which verifies that all the RBAC properties are followed.  In order to be 
sure that the model checker can find erroneous operations within the model, counterexamples are 
made in which each property are purposely made to fail.  The model checker finds each of these 
problems within the design of the WBSN model that must be found early within the development 
of the system, or else the mistakes made in early development will problematic and costly later.  
Before the WBSN is deployed into usage, developers must be sure that its security follows the 
required RBAC properties.  For if users are allowed access to a flawed network, a potentially 
devastating and unrecoverable leak of the sensitive and protected materials may occur.  
Chapter 2 introduces the purpose and functionality of social networks.  The security 
capabilities of complex systems will be presented along with multiple methods of access control. 
 Chapter 3 will cover the usage of model checking to determine system behavior.  Also 
included will be the steps taken to create a model and the role that temporal logic has in assisting 
in the endeavor. 
 Chapter 4 outlines the model design that must be followed in order to properly emulate a 
social network profile.  The access control policies governing an account‟s resources are covered 
in depth. 
 Chapter 5 covers the model checking procedure that is used to verify that the model 
created in chapter 4 adheres to the required access control polices of the account.  The CTL 
specifications used by the model checker will be covered in depth. 
 Chapter 6 is the case study done on the subject of whether or not model checking can 
determine if a breach in the access control policies of the system can located.  Experiences, both 
positive and negative, are covered in the process. 
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 Chapter 7 concludes the work and provides an outlook of how the model checking 
process can be beneficial in developing proficient security protocols for a complex system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Social Networks 
 The proliferation of the internet has allowed people to rapidly gather information, and instantly 
communicate with each other.  One of the most common communication methods is the use of 
social networks. A social network consists of a finite set of actors and the relations defined 
between them. (Wasserman et al., 1994)These relationships define the level of intimacy the 
actors have to each other in the social network as well as the level of interaction that is allowed 
between linked associates. Actors can range from being a single person to an entity consisting of 
multiple liaisons, such as a corporation. In a social network where the actors interact with as 
many people as they desire, the network‟s operation must ensure users that their uploaded data is 
secure against unwanted intruders.  This process begins with the users‟ ability to confirm the 
identity of a user. 
2.1 Identity Management System. 
 The Identity Management System is an important oversight feature of social networks. 
This process allows users to upload their data onto the social network and control how it is 
displayed and accessed. (Hogben et al., 1994) Users can decide what credentials others must 
have in order to view the data.  For example, a user may determine that only those listed as a 
family member will be allowed to view all of their information.  Another would be that members 
of a larger social group, like the employees of a company, will only allow coworkers access to 
the stored data.  The user can even specifically target other users and control their access in great 
detail. Another feature of the Identity Management System is its ability to track who has 
accessed a user‟s data. This allows the user to make sure others are only querying the data they 
are supposed to and ensure that unauthorized access is not taking place. Should someone not 
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follow the access control settings, the user can then take steps to restrict the trespasser‟s access to 
prevent future violations. 
Once the customers of a social network are sufficiently assured that only the authorized 
users have access to their profiles, some may wish to expand the number of ways in which their 
profiles are accessed, such as with Application Program Interface(API). API allows users to take 
their social network profiles and frame it inside a third party web application. This allows 
increased data portability for the users but also raises concerns about maintaining security and 
privacy in such an easily accessible format. Strict authorization schemes and other forms of 
access control must be strictly enforced to protect data sent through this new median of 
connection. (Hogben et al., 1994) 
2.2 Security of Social Networks    
  One implementation of social network security is a public/private key system. Upon 
joining a social network, the Identity Management System issues each of the users a token. 
These tokens contain the users‟ standard profile information as well as attribute levels of trust 
which cannot be alter.  As the users interact with each other over the network the trust ratings of 
their tokens are altered. After many users vouch for the integrity of one user, that user‟s token 
will have a positive value.  Should the users doubt the sincerity of a user, then that user‟s token 
will contain a negative value.  If other users completely distrust one user, they may even revoke 
any association with the perpetrator using the system‟s certificate management and block the 
maleficent user from their perspective parts of the network.  All of these token values assist users 
in determining if new acquaintances are trustworthy or insidious by evaluating the network‟s 
token opinion of them.  In the event of a user wishing to move to another social network that 
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uses the same token system, the user can have their token transferred with them to the new 
network. 
  This scheme is particularly useful in maintaining the appropriate level of privacy within 
a network. One could arrange it so that only people with a certain trust level and minimum level 
of interaction inside the network are able to view their information.  The tokens, arranged in a 
private/public key setup, can even be used to send encrypted data between users (Hogben et al., 
1994).  However, this scheme relies upon the administration of a whole group of users to vouch 
for the integrity of others and leaves open the possibility of nepotism or corruption inside the 
system.  A malicious person can create multiple accounts inside the network and have all the 
profiles rated positive.  This will disguise their malignant nature by having an inflated positive 
trust value. 
 Though the public/private key system may be useful in certain informal collaboration 
networks, it cannot be relied upon to secure a user‟s account from intrusion since it relies too 
much on the input of other users.  What is instead required is a form of security in which account 
holder can determine who else in the system can access their materials and to what degree.  Thus 
many social networks include a form of access control in which users can manually set the 
access control requirements of their uploaded resources.  The most frequently used are RBAC, 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). 
2.3 Role-Based Access Control 
RBAC is defined as allowing a system to clearly outline access control objectives in a 
mathematical and rigorous framework while also giving the users of the system a clear picture of 
the system‟s security arrangements and authoritarian obligations. (Sandu et al., 2001) RBAC has 
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the actors of a social network interact with the objects that are contained within the network.  
These actors, however, are given specific roles to determine what actions they can execute, what 
objects they can access, and where in the system they can go. Roles do not always need to be 
directly given to a user.  Instead, users can be encompassed into a group.  This group is then 
assigned a set of permissions that all members of that group can use. (Sandu et al., 1994)  Each 
of the objects created in the system have a level of clearance for all the data they contain.  No 
actor can gain control of that object without a relevant role, and thus permission, assigned to 
them. 
 
 
Figure 1: User/role relationships with objects 
 Roles define who inside of a system can access certain resources and how much 
interaction they can have with those resources.  As seen in Figure 1, users of role 1 can execute 
read, write and delete on objects 1 and 2 while users of role 2 can only do read on object 2.   An 
example of current systems that uses roles for operational purposes is Novell‟s Netware and 
Windows NT.  An administrator of a server or a database benefit from implementing their 
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systems with RBAC, which allows provides an easier format by which to police their domains.  
Some benefits of using them are: (Sandu et al., 1994) 
 Access control decisions are based on “the roles that individual users take on as 
part of the organization”; 
 Preferred in order to centrally control and maintain access rights that reflect the 
organization‟s protection guidelines. 
RBAC can also found in both operating systems and in user-level applications.  Over 
time many variations of RBAC have been implemented.  Some variations include whether or not 
relations exist between roles, roles and permissions, and users and roles.  An example would be a 
role in which multiple users should not have access to, such as President of the United States.  
There should only ever be one person with this role at any one time, or else there could be an 
error.  Some roles may even be able to inherit properties of other roles, so the system 
administrator does not need to repeatedly give permissions that are commonly used by everyone 
inside of the network.  Roles can even be arranged so that a ranked hierarchy is made or that a 
separation of duties and responsibilities are outlined in the system. 
One of the administrative benefits of roles is when system administrators must 
incorporate new users into their domain.  It is far easier, and less technical, for a system 
administrator to give a new user a role with predefined permissions than to assign them the 
permissions directly.  There is always the chance that the system‟s permissions will be altered to 
meet a new security requirement, and so it would be less troublesome to only change the 
permissions to the finite set roles than it would be to change the permissions to a massive 
number of users individually. 
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To access the maximum benefit of RBAC system, three principles must be followed. 
 Least Privilege:  Only those permissions required for the tasks to be performed by 
the user are assigned to the role. 
 Separation of Duties:  Invocation of mutually exclusive roles can be required to 
complete a sensitive task, such as requiring both an accounting clerk and an 
account manager to participate in issuing a check. 
 Data Abstraction:  Instead of using permissions typical of operating systems, such 
as read and write, abstract permissions, such as credit and debit for an account 
object, can be implemented. 
However, these principles are not fully necessary for every system, and the level to which each 
of the properties are followed is left to the system administrator to decide on their own.  Take the 
separation of duties property, which can be separated as dynamic or static.  In the static 
separation of duties, specific permissions should only be given exclusively to certain roles.  
Dynamic separation of duties requires analyzing the roles authorized to each user and requiring 
that users should not be given roles that do not conflict with the static separation of duties. An 
example of this is where a user, while in one role during a session, is not allow a specific 
permission, but may start again in a new session with a role that contains said conflicted 
permission. 
Other forms of access control that are used in parallel with RBAC are that of 
discretionary access control, DAC, and mandatory access control, MAC.  MAC is based upon 
the labeling of objects and users with security labels and only allowing interactions between 
those with similar labels.  DAC is based on the users‟ permissions or denials to objects, whose 
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access is arranged by the object‟s owner.  While RBAC is a form of access control on its own, it 
can also be incorporated with elements of both DAC and MAC when the need arises. 
2.4 Mandatory Access Control 
MAC is a type of RBAC security commonly seen in database operations.  Its main focus 
is the security of all accessed items while also ensuring secrecy.  MAC begins this process by 
having all users and system objects to be assigned an attribute level.  Afterwards, users in the 
system can only access an object with an equal attribute level.  This is similar to the 
classification levels used on government documents, such that Top Secret documents are only 
known and accessed by the higher echelons of the intelligence community, and Unclassified 
materials are seen and given to almost anyone that requests it. 
 
Figure 2:  Classification Levels of Security in the U.S. Government 
Some MAC environments take this step further by creating a multi-leveled security 
system. This is arranged by having the objects organized in order of their security level with 
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“ability to access anything in the system is reviewed by a reference monitor.”(DoD et al., 1985) 
The reference monitor determines if the actor attempting to access an object has the required 
security clearance.  Once approved the actor is allowed to perform actions that are allowed in his 
role.  The reference monitor also ensures two rules are in effect.  The first is the no-read-up rule, 
meaning that no user can access any object with clearance level higher than the one given in 
his/her role.  The second rule is that of no-write-down, in which information flows from lower 
clearance levels to higher levels and prevents information from flowing from higher to lower 
levels.  Thus a Top Secret document may contain references to a Classified document, but not 
the other way around.  Having the flow of information fashioned as such helps to preserve 
secrecy.  This is especially true in cases involving a Trojan horse virus inside of a MAC 
environment. 
 A Trojan horse is malicious code that is hidden within a program.  The goal is for the 
system to treat the program as an actor with a role of the highest, or at least higher, clearance.  
This will allow the Trojan horse to use system authorized functions on highly restrictive objects, 
thus violating all security policy under the eyes of the reference monitor.  Afterwards the Trojan 
horse will then undermine the information integrity by having system objects relabeled to a 
different clearance, or embed the data of a higher access object into a lower one.  MAC 
principles prevent either from occurring by first having all data objects of the system predefined 
with no actor able to alter them.  Second, MAC‟s rule of no-write downs, in which data of higher 
clearance is never sent to a lower clearance document, prevents the Trojan horse of embedding 
sensitive data into an unrestricted file. 
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2.5 Discretionary Access Control 
 DAC is an access scheme in which the creator of an object determines who can interact 
with an object and what functions can be performed. (Osborn et al., 2000) The owner, who is 
usually the creator, is the only user that can set the permissions of the object.  These permissions 
are then used to determine which commands specific users or group of users can perform upon 
the object.  A DAC system in essence must follow three rules of operation (Osborn et al., 2000). 
 The creator of an object is also the owner. 
 The object will only have one owner. 
 The deletion of the object can only be undertaken by the owner. 
It should be noted that some systems allow for ownership of an object to change.  These 
changes could be that the object is given to a new user, a user has taken a copy of someone else‟s 
object and makes it their own, or that ownership of an object is set by whoever uses the object 
last.  Enforcement of this rule has led to variations into the DAC scheme. 
1. Strict DAC is where the owner of the object is the only one who can set the permissions 
to the object.  However whoever has read access to the object can easily copy its contents 
into their own object. 
2. Liberal DAC is where the owner of the object can set the permissions and can even allow 
a set of users the ability of granting authority to other users.  The number of repetitions of 
granting authority is delegated by the original owner of the object. 
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3. DAC With Changes to Ownership is where ownership of an object can be reissued and 
revoked by those accessing it.  For example, one user may grant access to their object to 
another user.  The new user can then grant access to whoever they want, and possibly 
causing a chain of grants.  However, each user can still have their access permission 
revoked by the one gave it to them. 
2.6 Forms of Authorizing Access Control Permissions 
No matter which of the above forms of access control is implemented for a complex 
system, the main priority is to control the permissions given to each person.  Information systems 
as we know them today offer services in which people can store, modify, and query the 
information that is contained within the system. (Thion et al., 2006) The main basis of the access 
control mechanisms that are used center around whether a subject, which could be a user or a 
process, is able to perform an operation, such as read or write, upon an object, such as a file or a 
folder.  These operations upon objects are seen as system permissions.  Permissions are usually 
not directly assigned to each user.  As stated before, this would be time consuming and would 
lead to an increase chance of administrative mishandling. (Bertino et al., 2003) Instead, the 
permissions are categorized by the roles that need them within the system organization.  The 
necessary roles are then given to the proper users and in turn, those users are only assigned 
permissions they need. 
 RBAC has three ways in which permissions can be implemented.  Positive authorization 
is based on users having the required permissions to perform some action upon an object.  For 
example, a user must have the write permission in order to execute write on an object.  Systems 
using this for the basis of an access control policy are said to be following an open RBAC model.  
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Negative authorization is where the permissions deny users from interacting with objects.  In this 
case, any user given the write permission cannot execute write upon the object.  This access 
control policy is known as a closed RBAC model.  There is also the option of using a 
combination of the two, which is known as hybrid RBAC, and also a form temporal RBAC that 
is based upon the amount of time in which a user has permission to an object. (Barker et al., 
2003) If a system uses a hybrid model of RBAC, it is possible for a user to have positive 
authorization to an object and also have a conflicting negative authorization.  In order to resolve 
this problem, “the system should support a conflict resolution strategy to determine which of the 
authorization policy should be followed.”(Castano et al., 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Model Checking 
 Modeling is used to demonstrate the relative shape and purpose of an object.  This is 
done either on something that was already made but hard to see in person or for an object before 
it is constructed.  The latter is done to give people a general idea of what the actual article will 
appear when finished, the materials used to build it and to determine the estimation of the cost to 
construct the object.  More thorough forms of modeling can even show points of weakness and 
assist in the removing of unnecessary or unwanted attributes from the design.  One example 
would be a shipwright making a model in order to show the scaled design of a project.  This will 
assist in planning the needed financial and material assets to begin construction. 
  3.1 Overview of Model Checking 
 In computers, modeling is used to simulate the design of hardware and software in order 
to determine the behavior of the system with a set of inputs.  In the case of circuits, simulation is 
performed on a model design of a circuit which involve providing certain inputs and observing 
the corresponding outputs. (Clarke et al., 1999) This behavioral model simulation is then used 
with various scenarios to observe how the system operates, what types of errors can occur, and 
can the system handle an error exception without fatally crashing.  This is very similar to Formal 
Methods, whose main purpose is to take the “applied mathematics for modeling and analyzing 
ICT systems.”(Baier et al., 2008) While attempting to check the correctness with a mathematical 
mindset, Formal Methods can be made to work with both hardware and software designs.  They 
are frequently used by multiple international organizations for their potential in detecting costly 
defects. 
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 A model of a system‟s behavior is made to display the functionality and reactions during 
its runtime or show what flaws are currently present that may compromise its operation.  This is 
called “deductive verification and involves the use of axioms and proof rules to prove 
correctness in the system.” (Clarke et al., 1999) In the beginning this was arduously done by 
hand by developers to ensure that all possible test cases were taken into account.  This time 
consuming process was overtaken with the use of software tools to allow for a systematic 
analysis of the proofs in the system. 
 Model Checking is a more preferable process to deductive verification of a concurrent 
finite state system.  The overall process can be done without much manual input from the user 
and instead mostly involves the software checking all possible states automatically.  “The 
procedure normally uses an exhaustive search of the state space of the system to determine if 
some specification is true or not and, if given sufficient resources, the procedure will always 
terminate with a yes/no answer.” (Clarke et al., 1999) 
 
Figure 3: Kripke Structure for Mutual Exclusion (Clarke et al., 1999) 
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While the scope of the systems used may seem limited, due to the requirement of being 
finite, all hardware and software designs are finite state systems in reality and can be displayed 
in the form of a Kripke structure.“A Kripke structure is used to better illustrate the formal model 
and its various finite states by displaying the entire set of states, the transitions between states, 
and a function that labels each state with a set of properties that are true in this state.” (Clarke et 
al., 1999) The transitions displayed in a Kripke structure show the required actions needed to be 
taken by the system to reach the next state.  This form of the model further assists the model 
checking process by demonstrating the cumulative after effects of the system‟s operation over 
time. 
Kripke structures are formally defined: (Clarke et al., 1999) 
Let AP be a set of atomic propositions.  A Kripke structure M over AP is a four tuple M = (S, S0, 
R, L) where 
1. S is a finite set of states. 
2. S0  ⊆ S is the set of initial states. 
3. R ⊆ S x S is a transition relation that must be total, that is,  
for every state s ε S there is a state s′ε such that R(s, s′). 
4. L ∶ S → 2AP  is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions true in 
that state. 
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3.2 Steps of Model Checking 
 “Model-based verification is the process of creating a model of a system‟s behavior in a 
mathematically precise and singular manner.” (Baier et al., 2008) Once accomplished, an 
accurate rendition of the system will usually allow the engineers to notice signs of 
incompleteness, ambiguities, and inconsistencies that would be expensive to repair at a later 
stage of the project‟s life cycle. “Model checking is in essence the exploration of all possible 
system states in a brute force manner.”(Baier et al., 2008)  Some problems that are examined in a 
system are classic computer science obstacles, such as deadlock and starvation.  However, others 
can be more specific to the requirements of the project.  Will the system always send a reply in 
twenty seconds, can the system consistently recover from failure during its lifetime of use, and 
will the system always be able to reach a certain state after an operation?  Model checking can 
accommodate whatever requirements the developers must observe with the ability to track any 
necessary system states and further develop a realistic rendered model. 
 Once an accurate finite-state model of a system is created, the model checker will explore 
all relevant system states in an attempt to verify that the model follows all necessary properties.  
If the model checker should come across a state that shows otherwise, a counterexample will 
trace the path of how the system could reach such an unacceptable situation.  A user will then be 
able to study the path to assist in remodeling the design.  This entire process can be classified 
into the following three states: Modeling Phase, Running Phase, and Analysis Phase. 
3.3Modeling Phase 
 The obvious first step to model checking is to begin building a model for the model 
checker to analyze.  The system design to be considered is converted into the formalism accepted 
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by the model checking tool. (Clarke, Grumberg, Peled 1999)Once the general shape is 
formulated, the system‟s model is then given an initial state.”  A state is a snapshot or 
instantaneous description of the system and captures the values of the variables at a particular 
instant of time.” (Clarke et al., 1999)  These states are used to show the transitional changes of 
the system during its operation and allows for the display of these transitions in the form of 
before and after shots. 
After the proposed design of a system is finished, the choice of which properties will be 
verified and checked must be made.  These properties can be anything from deadlock detection 
to unauthorized user access and can lead to an unlimited number of desired properties planned 
during the modeling phase, but sometimes only the most important are included into the model. 
This junction of the modeling phase is known as specification.  Specification is handled by a 
form of logic formalism, called temporal logic, which is expressive of the system‟s behavior over 
time and has proved to be useful for specifying concurrent systems. (Clarke, Grumberg, Peled 
1999)  The syntax and semantics of the branch of temporal logic used in this thesis is discussed 
below. 
3.3.1Temporal Logic 
“Temporal logic is a formal logic for describing sequences of transitions between states 
in a reactive system while not mentioning time explicitly.” (Clarke et al., 1999) This logic is also 
termed to be linear in nature since, as the Kripke structure is transversed over time, there is only 
ever one successor state that is used from the previous state.  Temporal logic‟s specification 
formulas are designed to test if the model will enter a certain state eventually or never enter an 
error state. 
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 Computation Tree Logic, or CTL, is a branching-time logic version of temporal logic, 
meaning that its model of time is a tree-like structure in which the future is not determined; there 
are different paths in the future, any one of which might be the „actual‟ path realized. (Huth et 
al., 2004)  In order to selectively analyze the states of the model path quantifiers, which are used 
to express the branching of a computation tree, and temporal quantifiers, which are used to 
describe the properties of a path in a tree, are used.  There are two path quantifiers used in CTL.  
A is used to represent “for all computation paths,” and E, representing “from some computation 
path”.  A’s meaning is that starting at a particular state, all of its successor states must uphold 
some property.  E represents that starting at a particular state, there should exist a path to a 
successor state in which some property is upheld. Used in conjunction with these path quantifiers 
are five basic temporal operators: 
 X (“next time”) requires that a property holds in the second state of the path. 
 F (“eventually” or “in the future”) operator is used to assert that a property will hold at 
some state on the path. 
 G (“always” or “globally”) specifies that a property holds at every state on the path. 
 U (“until”) first property listed holds until a particular state in which the second property 
will then hold. 
 R (“release”) the second property holds along the path up to and including the first state 
where the first property holds, but does not require the first property to hold eventually. 
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3.3.2 Syntax of CTL 
 In reference to the aforementioned path quantifiers and temporal operators, CTL 
statements can be defined as such. 
Definition (Huth et al., 2004) 
CTL formulas are defined inductively via a Backus Naur form: 
𝜙 ∶≔ ⊥  T   𝑝   ¬ 𝜙   𝜙 ∨ 𝜙   𝜙 ∧ 𝜙   𝜙 →  𝜙  
 𝐴𝑋 𝜙 𝐸𝑋𝜙 𝐴𝐹𝜙 𝐸𝐹 𝜙 𝐴𝐺 𝜙 𝐸𝐺 𝜙 𝐴 𝜙𝑈𝜙  𝐸[𝜙𝑈𝜙] 
3.3.3 Semantics of CTL 
Definition: Let 𝑀 = (𝑆, →, 𝐿) be a model for CTL, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, and 𝜙 a CTL formula.  The relation 
𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙 is defined by structural induction on 𝜃: 
1. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝑇 and 𝑀, 𝑠 ¬⊨⊥ 
2. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝑝 iff 𝑝 ∈ 𝐿(𝑠) 
3. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  ¬𝜙 iff 𝑀, 𝑠¬⊨ 𝜙 
4. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜙1 ∧ 𝜙2 if 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙1and 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙2 
5. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜙1 ∨ 𝜙2 if 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙1or 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙2 
6. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝜙1 → 𝜙2 if 𝑀, 𝑠¬⊨  𝜙1or 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨  𝜙2 
7. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐴𝑋 𝜙 iff for all 𝑠1 such that 𝑠 →  𝑠1 we have 𝑀, 𝑠1 ⊨ 𝜙.  Thus, 𝐴𝑋 says: 
„in every next state.‟ 
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8. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐸𝑋 𝜙 iff for some 𝑠1 such that 𝑠 →  𝑠1 we have 𝑀, 𝑠1 ⊨ 𝜙.  Thus, 𝐸𝑋 
says: „in some next state.” E is a dual to A – in exactly the same way that ∃ is the 
dual to ∀ in predicate logic. 
9. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐴𝐺 𝜙 holds iff for all paths 𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  𝑠1equals 𝑠, and 
all 𝑠𝑖  along the path, we have 𝑀, 𝑠𝑖 ⊨  𝜙.  Mnemonically:  for all computation 
paths beginning in 𝑠 the property 𝜙 holds Globally.  Note that „along the path‟ 
includes the path‟s initial state. 
10. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐸𝐺 𝜙 holds iff there is a path𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  𝑠1equals 𝑠, and 
for all 𝑠𝑖  along the path, we have 𝑀, 𝑠𝑖 ⊨  𝜙.  Mnemonically:  there exists a path 
beginning in 𝑠 such that 𝜙 holds Globally along the path. 
11. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐴𝐹 𝜙 holds iff for all paths𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  𝑠1equals 𝑠, there 
is some 𝑠𝑖  such that 𝑀, 𝑠𝑖 ⊨  𝜙.  Mnemonically: for All computation paths 
beginning in 𝑠 there will be some Future state where 𝜙. 
12. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐸𝐹 𝜙 holds iff for all paths𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  𝑠1 equals 𝑠, there 
is some𝑠𝑖  such that 𝑀, 𝑠𝑖 ⊨  𝜙.  Mnemonically: for All computation paths 
beginning in 𝑠 there will be some Future state where𝜙. 
13. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐴[𝜙1 𝑈 𝜙2]  holds iff for all paths 𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  𝑠1equals 
𝑠, that path satisfies 𝜙1 𝑈 𝜙2, i.e., there is some 𝑠𝑖  along the path, such that  such 
that 𝑀, 𝑠𝑖 ⊨ 𝜙2, and, for each 𝑗 < 𝑖, we have 𝑀, 𝑠𝑗 ⊨ 𝜙1.  Mnemonically: All 
computation paths beginning in 𝑠 satisfy that 𝜙1Until 𝜙2holds on it. 
14. 𝑀, 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐸[𝜙1 𝑈 𝜙2] holds iff there is a paths 𝑠1 →  𝑠2  →  𝑠3 → ⋯, where  
𝑠1equals 𝑠, and that path satisfies 𝜙1 𝑈 𝜙2 as specified in 13.  Mnemonically: 
there Exists a computation path beginning in 𝑠 such that 𝜙1Until 𝜙2holds on it. 
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3.4 Running and Analysis Phases 
Once the specifications of the system properties have been finished, the running phase 
commences.  This begins by giving the model checker as input the model M and a set of 
temporal logic specification 𝜙.  With S being the entire set of states in M, the model checker will 
transverse all states 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 to determine whether or not 𝑠 ⊨  𝜃 holds.  Once the model checker is 
finished, it will output all of the temporal logic specifications that were followed in side of the 
model.  Should the model not uphold any of the formulas the model checker will print a history 
trace.  This trace will show a path through the model‟s states to show how to reach the state 
where the error occurs. 
An error can be discovered for many reasons during the model checking process.  A 
likely occurrence is that of a memory error during the running phase, in which the model was too 
large for the program and thus had to abort.  The only real solution, other than modifying the 
model checker to have more memory, is to break the model into multiple separate parts and test 
each one individually.  The latter abstract process relies upon the fact that if all the parts of a 
system operate correctly and follow the specifications then the entire system should work as 
well.  Another source of an error could be that the system was incorrectly modeled before any 
testing and analysis is attempted and thus returns vitiated results.  This means that the model and 
its verification properties do not accurately reflect the required design of the system.  A return to 
the modeling phase would be required to ensure that all faulty components and specification 
properties are removed or reconfigured.  If the properties within the specification language are 
correct, then a flaw in the model is the cause of the error.  The model has a state in which the 
system could compromise a specification property that must be upheld.  The system design must 
then be improved to eliminate the flaw.  However, if the specification properties are flawed and 
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the model is actually correctly designed, then the analysis phase will report that an unacceptable 
state is reachable inside of the model.  The only solution is to change the specification into a 
form that can properly test the given model.  Once the verification phase of the model checking 
process is finished, the developers will be able to evaluate and correct the discovered of the 
deficiencies that exist inside of the current design of a system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Modeling RBAC in a Social Network 
Before beginning to outline how the RBAC properties of a social network are to be 
represented by a formal model, the model checker must be discussed.  In this paper, the New 
Symbolic Model Verifier (NuSMV) model-checking system is used to assist in determining if 
our social network model adheres to a set of temporal logic specification that will verify that the 
model upholds the required RBAC properties. NuSMV provides a language for describing the 
models and directly checks if the temporal logic formulas are valid inside of the model. (Huth et 
al., 2004)  The model checker takes as input a text describing our social network model and print 
as output TRUE if a temporal logic specification holds within the model.  If any of the 
specifications do not hold, the program will then print a trace showing why the specifications are 
false inside of the model. 
 
Figure 4:  Model of the Example Network. 
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To use as an example, imagine a small social network consisting of the roles of editor, writer 
and intern.  This network contains within it resources consisting of a movie and a review of the 
movie.  Each role is granted specific permissions that allow them to execute commands upon the 
two resources.  Writer‟s have the ability to Read and Write the movie review resource. Editors 
should be able to Play, Copy, and Delete the movie resources and Intern‟s should only be able 
use the Play command on movies.  Editor‟s also have subordinate interns to whom the editor 
authorizes to use Play on the Movie Resource. 
The SMV language of our model will consist of multiple modules which are identical to 
classes. Modules can declare variables and functions within their scope and reassign new values 
to variables during the operation of the model checker. To aid in readability and construction, 
our social network model will be broken down into various modules that are used to represent 
roles, user and resources.  Just like in other programming languages, the program must start with 
a main module.   
4.1 Overview of the Program Structure 
MODULE main 
The scope of the main module begins the line after this one and ends when another MODULE is 
written.  This scope includes three sections.  VAR, ASSIGN, and SPEC.  The scope of main will 
include declarations of all of the resources needed for this model in the VAR section. 
VAR 
movie : videoResource(); 
movieReview : textFileResource(); 
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In our example the needed resources are that of movie and the movie review.  To model these 
resources a variable is declared with the names of movie and movieReview.  The text to the right 
of the semicolon in the statement assigns a type to the variable.  The videoResource() and 
textFileResource() are modules used to represent resources of a video and text type and will be 
covered later.  By having the variables declared with their type specifer as the modules, each is a 
new instance of the module.  Along with the resources, the permissions to each role connected to 
main must also be declared. 
editorPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
writerPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
The editorPermA and writerPermA are variables of the permissions that roles editor and writer 
will have to the movie variable.  The array following the semicolon tells us that the variables are 
an array and the 0..2 refers to the range of elements that will exist within the array, meaning zero 
to two.  Each element represents a permission to the movie variable; zero for Play, one for Copy, 
and two for Delete.   Following the of is the type of values the array will be allowed to contain, 
in this case Boolean.  If the element of the permission is true, then the role will allow the user to 
have that permission to the movie resource.  If the element is false, then the role will not allow 
the user to have that permission to the movie resource.  Of course, since there are two resources 
the roles will need another set of permission arrays in this model. 
editorPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
writerPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
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The editorPermB and writerPermB follow the same principles of the previous variables except 
that they refer to the permissions the roles will have to the movieReview variable.  The only 
permissions that the roles can send to movieReview are that of Read and Write.  Thus the array 
is set to a range of zero to one with zero for the Read permission and one for the Write 
permission.  Once the permission array variables are declared the values to their elements may 
then be given in the ASSIGN section. 
ASSIGN 
editorPermA[0] := TRUE; 
editorPermA[1] := TRUE; 
editorPermA[2] := TRUE; 
editorPermB[0] := FALSE; 
editorPermB[1] := FALSE; 
 
writerPermA[0] := FALSE; 
writerPermA[1] := FALSE; 
writerPermA[2] := FALSE; 
writerPermB[0] := TRUE; 
writerPermB[1] := TRUE; 
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As explained within the example, the editor should only have the permissions to Play, 
Copy, and Delete the movie variable while not having Read and Write to the movieReview 
variable.  The writer should only be assigned Read and Write to movieReview and should not 
have the Play, Copy and Delete permissions to the movie variable.  To set the permissions each 
array‟s elements are assigned, represented by the := symbol, the necessary Boolean value to the 
role‟s required permission.  Thus editorPermA‟s elements from zero to two are set to TRUE and 
editorPermB‟s element zero and one are set to FALSE while writerPermA elements zero to two 
are false and writerPermB elements zero to one are set to true.  After the resource variables and 
the role permission arrays are set, main will then send those variables that are instances of the 
next role modules.  This is accomplished by declaring two variables in VAR once again. 
role1 : editorRole(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB); 
role2 : writerRole(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB); 
As with the movie and movieReview variables, role1 and role2 are instances of the editorRole 
and writerRole modules.  This time however, the role modules require the instances of both 
resource objects and the related permission arrays as parameters.  From these variables the 
model‟s development moves from main to the editorRole and writerRole modules, but before 
continuing on with the role modules, the resource modules must be explained. 
4.2 Modeling the Resources 
 In main, the movie variable‟s type specifier is that of videoResource(), which makes the 
variable an instance of that module in the NuSMV file. 
MODULE videoResource() 
 39 
 
The module begins just like many using MODULE to state where the scope of videoResource() 
beings and what parameters it requires when a variable instance is created.  By having the 
parentheses blank, this instance needs no parameters when declared.  In our example, the 
commands that users can execute on movie are that of Play, Copy, and Delete.  In order to model 
that an object of type videoResource() is receiving the commands a variable must be included 
that changes to the next user command the object receives. 
VAR 
state : {Wait, Play, Copy, Delete}; 
In the VAR section, a variable state is declared.  Unlike the other variables so far, state is an 
enumerated type variable with the commands as possible values that state can be equated to.  
Wait is included in the enumeration for when a user does not send any of the commands or does 
not have permissions to execute any of the commands.  Based upon this knowledge, a Kripke 
structure of video resource variable can be constructed.  The Kripke transition values will be 
covered later on in the user module. 
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Figure 5:  The Kripke Structure of a video resource with the requirements to reach each state. 
Since state is an enumerated variable, its initial state must be assigned.  Otherwise the model 
checker will set it at random. 
ASSIGN 
init(state) := Wait; 
The init() function takes the variable within its parameters and sets its starting value to the 
enumeration following the := symbol.  State is thus set to Wait since when the model begins, no 
one has sent any commands to the resource yet. 
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Figure 6:  The Kripke Structure of a text resource with the requirements to reach the each state. 
 
 The textFileResource() module follows the same layout as videoResource(). 
MODULE textFileResource() 
VAR 
state : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
ASSIGN 
init(state) := Wait; 
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The module has not passed any parameters from main.  Its state variable is set to the possible 
commands users‟ can send the resource and the initial state is set to Wait. 
4.3 Modeling the Roles 
 In main, the instances of variables of type editorRole and writerRole were made.  These 
modules are passed instances of the resource variables created in main and the roles‟ permission 
arrays in order to model what permissions will be allowed to these roles inside of the network. 
MODULE writerRole(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB) 
VAR 
user2 : process User(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB); 
In the module writerRole, the system resources and the writer‟s permission arrays to those 
resources are received from main as parameters and passes them to the user2 variable, whose 
type specifier is a module titled User.  The User module is used to model how users will be able 
to interact with the system resources based upon the permissions received from the role modules. 
MODULE editorRole(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB) 
VAR 
user1 : process User(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB); 
internPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
internPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
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The editorRole module follows the same outline as the writerRole.  It receives the resources and 
permission arrays from main and sends them to a variable that is an instance of the User module.  
However, unlike the writerRole, the editorRole module has a subordinate role underneath it and 
thus the function of the editor setting that role‟s permissions and passing them to their module 
must be modeled.  This requires that a new set of permission arrays are created for the connected 
role module.  As before in main, internPermA is a three element array of the permissions a user 
may have to the movie resource and internPermB is a two element array to the movieReview 
resource.  These elements must then be set in the ASSIGN section with values required by our 
example. 
ASSIGN 
internPermA[0] := TRUE; 
internPermA[1] := FALSE; 
internPermA[2] := FALSE; 
internPermB[0] := FALSE 
internPermB[1] := FALSE; 
As stated before, the intern role should only have the Play permission to the movie resource.  
Thus only interPermA[0] is set to TRUE and all others are made FALSE. 
role3 : internRole(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB); 
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The instances of the resources and the now assigned permission arrays are then passed as 
parameters to the role3 variable, which is an instance of the internRole module, in the VAR 
section. 
MODULE internRole(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB) 
VAR 
user3 : process User(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB); 
The internRole module takes the resource instances and permission arrays and uses them as 
parameters to its own User instance variable user3. 
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4.4 Modeling Users’ Interaction with the Resources 
 
Figure 7(a): The movie resource is sent three different commands at the same during the 
running phase of the model checker.  (b) The Process Selector of the model checker randomly 
chooses the user that the resource will accept. 
The User module represents what commands a user will be allowed to send to the 
network resources.  The user1, user2, and user3 variables are declared with a type specifier of the 
module User with their parameters being the resources and the permission arrays that were sent 
to the variables‟ role module.  During the declaration of each variable, the keyword process is 
added after the semicolon.  This is because every user variable will be interacting with the same 
instance of the resources and attempt to send commands simultaneously.  Each resource, 
however, can only execute one command at a time.  To ensure that only one command is 
accepted by the network resources, the user variables are designated as processes.  During the 
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running phase of the model checker, a variable called process_selecter will randomly choose one 
of the variables and have its command sent to the resources while the commands of the other 
user processes are ignored. 
MODULE User(movie, movieReview, permA, permB) 
VAR 
myCommandA : {Wait, Play, Copy, Delete}; 
myCommandB : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
The User module shows once again that it is receives as parameters the same instances of the 
system resources and the permission arrays from the role module.  Within the scope of the User 
module, the permission arrays passed to the module as parameters are called permA and permB.  
This is because it is unknown which role instance the User module was declared to.  Two 
enumerated variables, myCommandA and myCommandB, are declared within the scope of the 
module and model the user sending commands to the resources.  Variable myCommandA is the 
user‟s command to movie and myCommandB is to movieReview.  Thus the possible values of 
the variables are identical to the state of the resources. 
ASSIGN 
init(myCommandA) := Wait; 
init(myCommandB) := Wait; 
Since the module has yet to analyze the permissions in the array, both myCommandA and 
myCommandB are set to the Wait value. 
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next(myCommandA) :=    case 
The next() function takes the variable within its parentheses and sets its next value.  The possible 
values of myCommandA are based upon the possible values of the user‟s permissions to the 
movie resource.  To determine the next value a case expression is used, starting where the case 
keyword is displayed is used to analyze the values of the permission array.   
     (permA[0] & !permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Play}; 
   (!permA[0] & permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Copy}; 
     (permA[0] & permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Copy}; 
   (!permA[0] & !permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Delete}; 
     (permA[0] & !permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Delete}; 
   (!permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Copy, Delete}; 
     (permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Delete}; 
The statements following the case keyword are the cases of the case expression.  To the left of 
the semicolon are the values the permissions must have in the case and the right contains the 
allowed next values of myCommand.  Elements without the exclamation point must equal true 
and elements with the exclamation point must equal false.  Examining the first case statement, 
the next value of myCommandA can be either Wait or Play should the permA[0] be true and 
permA[1] and permA[2] are false.  However, if the user does not receive any permissions from 
their role a default case must be included. 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
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   esac; 
The last case is exercised if none of the above cases are used and results in the user only sending 
Wait commands to the resource.  The esac; is the key word used to end the switch statement. 
next(myCommandB) := case 
     (permB[0] & !permB[1]) : {Wait, Read}; 
   (!permB[0] & permB[1]) : {Wait, Write}; 
     (permB[0] & permB[1]) : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
   esac; 
The function of next(myCommandB) follows the same outline as myCommandA except 
that there are only three possible cases, and the default, that may result from the second 
permission array.  During the running phase of the model checker, the program will randomly 
select the value of the commands from the results of the relevant switch statement repeatedly.  
For example if the second case was used, the model checker will randomly select the values of 
Wait or Write for myCommandB and do so again and again while the model checker is 
operating.  Whichever values are chosen for the user commands will be used to change the state 
of the resources. 
next(movie.state) :=  case 
   myCommandA != Wait : myCommandA; 
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   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
next(movieReview.state) := case 
   myCommandB != Wait : myCommandB; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
The next function of the resources is used to change the values of the resources‟ state 
variable and thus models the users‟ ability to alter resources by the commands that they send.  As 
before with the user commands, the next enumerated value of the states is determined by a 
switch statement of two cases.  The first case being that should the user command to the resource 
not equal Wait, the value of the resource state is changed to the value of the command.  
Otherwise by default, the state is set to the Wait value. 
4.5 Modeling User Sessions 
In a complex system, users may be granted more than one role in order for them to 
perform their required tasks within the network.  If the user is using a role that does not grant 
them the necessary permissions, they may log out and log back into the system with the 
appropriate role.  In order to model this procedure the main module will need a set of variables 
containing what roles a user is assigned in the account. 
   jamesRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   brianRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
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   jacobRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   willyRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
In this example four users will be assigned roles that are implemented within the account.  
Those roles are intern, editor, and writer.  The above four variables are arrays of three Boolean 
elements whose values will be used to determine the users‟ given roles.  For example, should 
jamesRoles[0] be equal to true, then in our model the user James is able to log in as an intern.  
Element one refers to the editor role and element two is for the writer role.  The elements of the 
arrays will have their values set in the ASSIGN section of the main module. 
  jamesRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  jamesRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  jamesRoles[2] := FALSE; 
 
  brianRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  brianRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  brianRoles[2] := TRUE; 
 
  jacobRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  jacobRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  jacobRoles[2] := FALSE; 
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  willyRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  willyRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  willyRoles[2] := FALSE; 
For our model, user James is to be allowed the roles of intern and editor.  Brian will be assigned 
the writer role and users Jacob and Willy will only be permitted to log in as interns. 
 In the example model, only one user is allowed to use the editor and writer roles at any 
given time.  To model the system preventing multiple users from using the same restrictive roles 
at the same time, a semaphore must be included. 
   semEditor : semaphore(); 
   semWriter : semaphore(); 
In the VAR section of main, a variable is declared with a type specifier of semaphore for each of 
the two restrictive roles.  These variables are thus instances of the semaphore module. 
 
MODULE semaphore() 
VAR 
   sema : boolean; 
   userName : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
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The semaphore module takes no parameters and declares a variables sema, of type Boolean, and 
an enumerated variable userName.  Variable sema will be used to determine if a user will be 
allowed to log in as the role protected by the semaphore.  If the value is true, the user is allowed 
to change their role to the exclusive role, and if it is false, the user may not.  Variable 
userName‟s possible values are the names of the users that exist in the system and will be used to 
determine which of the users triggered variable sema. 
ASSIGN 
   init(sema) := FALSE; 
   init(userName) := None; 
Variable sema‟s initial value is set to false and userName is that of None. 
 
VAR 
   name1 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name2 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name3 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name4 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
ASSIGN 
  name1 := James; 
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  name2 := Brian; 
  name3 := Jacob; 
  name4 := Willy; 
 Since the semaphores keep track of the user that is using the exclusive role, a variable 
must be initialized in main that will allow semaphore to know which user is specifically using 
the role.  In the above VAR section of main, four enumerated variables are declared whose 
possible values are the names of the users in the account.  They are each given an unused 
enumeration value in ASSIGN. 
   userJames : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, jamesRoles, name1); 
   userBrian : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, brianRoles, name2); 
   userJacob : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, jacobRoles, name3); 
   userWilly : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, willyRoles, name4); 
As the last part of the process all of the semaphore variables, a paired set of role array 
and name variable are used as parameters for a set of specific named user variable instances of 
the userSessions modules.  These variables model each user‟s ability to change roles between 
sessions in the account.  The variables are also processes since multiple users may attempt to 
trigger the semaphores at the same time. 
 
MODULE userSessions(semEditor, semWriter, givenRoles, myName) 
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VAR 
   activeRole : {loggedOut, intern, editor, writer}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(activeRole) := {loggedOut}; 
 The userSessions module takes as parameters the semaphores declared in main, the name 
of the user represented in this instance and their assigned roles.  The variable activeRole is 
declared in the scope of the module to track the status of the user‟s current role.  ActiveRole is an 
enumerated variable with all user roles and loggedOut as a possible value.  LoggedOut is used to 
represent when the user is no longer actively using a role and is not engaged in a session within 
the account.  The initial value of activeRole is set to loggedOut since the module has yet to 
analyze the values in the givenRoles array. 
   next(activeRole) := case 
   (givenRoles[2] & !semWriter.sema) : {loggedOut, writer}; 
   (givenRoles[1] & !semEditor.sema) : {loggedOut, editor}; 
   (givenRoles[0]) : {loggedOut, intern}; 
   TRUE : loggedOut; 
   esac; 
The next value of activeRole is determined by the results of a switch statement that examines the 
givenRoles array from highest to lowest with the relevant semaphore.  If the element inside the 
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array is true and the sema variable in the semaphore is false, activeRole‟s value is changed to 
that value.  Should none of the switch statement cases be used, the result of the default case 
makes the activeRole variable set to loggedOut.  For example, if user James only has 
givenRoles[1] set true and the semEditor sema variable if false, James‟s activeRole may become 
either loggedOut or the editor role as shown in the second case.  If semEditor‟s sema is true, 
which means someone else is using the role at the time, the default case is evoked and user 
James‟s activeRole can only be set to loggedOut.  Once semEditor‟s sema is equal to false again, 
the second case will result in user James activeRole being set to either loggedOut or editor. 
   next(semEditor.userName) := case 
     activeRole = editor : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
   next(semWriter.userName) := case 
     activeRole = writer : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 Should the user‟s activeRole be one of the restricted roles, the semaphore of the role must 
be set to true in order to prevent another user from logging in with that same role.  The above 
next functions change the value of the semaphore‟s userName variable to the name of user if that 
user‟s activeRole is equal to the role of the semaphore.  It should be noted that these next 
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functions of the semaphores‟ username variable are implemented after the sema variable next 
function since the value of userName must not be changed until after the sema is altered. 
   next(semEditor.sema) := case 
     activeRole = editor : TRUE; 
     activeRole != editor & semEditor.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
   next(semWriter.sema) := case 
     activeRole = writer : TRUE; 
     activeRole != writer & semEditor.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 The first switch statement case of the semaphore results in the sema variable set to TRUE 
should the user‟s activeRole equal the semaphore role.  The second statement is used when the 
user logs out of the exclusive role and sets the sema variable to false.  When the user changes 
their activeRole out of the semaphore‟s exclusive role, their activeRole will not be equal to the 
role but the userName has not yet been changed.  With the user no longer using the role and 
user‟s name stored as the person who activated the semaphore, the sema variable is thus set to 
false.  If the first two cases are not used then by default the sema variable is false. 
Chapter 5: Model Checking RBAC in a Social Network 
During the modeling phase, a model is developed to represent the operation and features of a 
social network.  Since the main priority and concern of a social network is the strength and 
efficacy of its security, the model and its checker will focus on the RBAC properties that must be 
correctly implemented by the Social Network. 
The NuSMV model checker, works by taking a model as input and checks all existing and 
possible states of that model to determine if it fails to uphold a given set of specifications.  These 
specifications, made in CTL and added to the model‟s modules, represents specific rules that the 
model must follow in order to adhere to RBAC.  Should a discrepancy exist during the analysis 
phase of the model, the model checker will print a false value for the violated specification and 
traces the state transitions to where the trespass occurs.  These statements provided by the model 
checker will not only assist developers in determining if their current access control 
implementation is operating as required, but also aid in locating why certain components are not 
following the specification. 
5.1 Access Control Properties 
 In order to access any of the project resources existing within the social network account, 
users are given permissions from their role.  These permissions determine what actions they are 
allowed to execute to the resources and thus ensures that a user is only able to perform 
commands dictated by their role.  However, in order to ensure that any user is ever able to 
perform an action not licensed by their role, a CTL specification must be included for each of the 
permissions in the model.  These specifications will check if a user is able to send a command to 
the resources while not having the required permission. 
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SPEC AG ! (permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Play) 
 
Above is the specification is added to the scope of the User module to test that access 
control for the Play command is followed.  The keyword SPEC notifies the model checker that 
the line is a CTL statement and that should the model not adhere to the requirement of the 
temporal logic, a printout stating that the model is not compliant to the specification and a trace 
of why is made.  The AG is the path and operation quantifier demands that the model checker 
examines all possible global states within the scope of the User module during the running phase.  
The rough translation of the specification is that in “all global states,” myCommandA should not 
be equal to Play while permA[0] is equal to FALSE.  In our model, permA[0] is the permission 
need for the user to send the Play command to the movie resource, and myCommandA is the 
variable that represents the user‟s current command to the movie resource.  The possible values 
of myCommandA will be based upon a switch statement that analyzes all the elements of the 
permA array.  The value of myCommandA should not be able to equal Play without permA[0] 
being TRUE and is the requirement of the specification for the model to pass. 
     TRUE   :  {Wait, Play}; 
To see if the model checker can discover a flaw in the model that violates the 
specification, the result of the default case for myCommandA is changed to allow the user to 
either use the Wait or Play command.  Originally the default case is used when the permission 
array‟s elements are all false and thus the user is forced to only send the Wait command to the 
movie resource. 
-- specification AG !(permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Play) IN role1.userEditor is true 
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-- specification AG !(permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Play) IN role1.role3.userIntern is 
true 
-- specification AG !(permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Play) IN role2.userWriter is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
writerPermA[0] = FALSE 
    role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandA = Wait 
role2.userWriter.myCommandA = Wait 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role2.userWriter 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = TRUE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = FALSE 
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  role1.userEditor.running = FALSE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandA = Play 
 
 The output statement from the model checker reports that the access control specification 
for Play was followed by both the editor and intern users but not by the writer user.  In our 
example model, the writer user‟s myCommandA switch statement results in the default case 
since the writer should not be able to send Play to the movie resource.  The changes to the switch 
statement violate this principle and a trace is printed revealing the flaw.  State1.1contains the 
starting values held by the variables within the model and shows that the permA[0] for editor and 
intern are both true while writer is false. Input1.2, the process selector, chooses a user process 
that will transition to a flawed state.  The selector has the userWriter to run and shows that its 
myCommandA is changed to the value of Play even though its permA[0] is false. 
SPEC AG ! (permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Copy) 
The access control specifications for the other permissions follow the same outline as the 
first.  The above specification wants the model checker to verify that in “all global states” of the 
model, myCommandA should not be set to Copy if the user‟s permA[1], which is the permission 
element for Copy, is false. 
     (permA[0] & !permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Copy}; 
For a counterexample, the first case of myCommand is altered to allow for its value to be 
set to Copy while permA[1] is equal to false. 
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-- specification AG !(permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Copy) IN role1.userEditor is true 
-- specification AG !(permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Copy) IN role1.role3.userIntern is 
false 
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandA = Wait 
    role2.userWriter.myCommandA = Wait 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.role3.userIntern 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = TRUE 
  role1.userEditor.running = FALSE 
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-> State: 1.2 <- 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandA = Copy 
-- specification AG !(permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Copy) IN role2.userWriter is true 
The model checker outputs that the userWriter and userEditor both followed the Copy 
specification and that userIntern did not.  This is due to only the internRole user‟s 
myCommandA would have used the faulty case while the others did not.  The value of 
userIntern‟s internPermA[1] is false in State 1.1 and that the user was still able change 
myCommandA into Copy. 
SPEC AG ! (permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Delete) 
 The Delete Specification wants the model checker to verify that in “all global states” of 
the model, myCommandA cannot be set to Delete the related permission element, permA[2], is 
false. 
     TRUE   :  {Wait, Delete}; 
The default case is changed to allow users without any permission to have 
myCommandA‟s value equal to either Wait or Delete. 
-- specification AG !(permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Delete) IN role1.userEditor is true 
-- specification AG !(permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Delete) IN role1.role3.userIntern 
is true 
-- specification AG !(permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Delete) IN role2.userWriter is 
false 
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-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[2] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandA = Wait 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandA = Wait 
  -> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role2.userWriter 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = TRUE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.running = FALSE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
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  role2.userWriter.myCommandA = Delete 
The editor and intern users have both followed specification while the writer caused a failure.  
State 1.1 shows the writer not having true in permA[2], but has still executed Delete in its 
myCommandA in state 1.2. 
SPEC AG ! (permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) 
The Read specification has the model checker verify that in “all global states” of the 
model, the user‟s myCommandB must not be equal to Read if permB[0], which is the permission 
element for Read, is false. 
     TRUE   :  {Wait, Read}; 
To test the specification, Read is included in the default case of myCommandB. 
-- specification AG !(permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) IN role1.userEditor is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermB[0] = FALSE 
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  writerPermB[0] = TRUE 
    role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Wait 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandB = Wait 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.userEditor 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.running = TRUE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Read 
-- specification AG !(permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) IN role1.role3.userIntern is 
false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
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Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermB[0] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[0] = TRUE   
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Wait 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandB = Wait 
-> Input: 2.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.role3.userIntern 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = TRUE 
  role1.userEditor.running = FALSE 
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-> State: 2.2 <- 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Read 
-- specification AG !(permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) IN role2.userWriter is true 
The model checker reports that the editor and intern users did not follow the specification while 
the writer did.  The first trace printed shows that the editor‟s permB[0] is false and that the user 
was still able to have myCommandB send Read to the resource.  The second trace shows the 
intern user in the same circumstances. 
SPEC AG ! (permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) 
The Write specification states that in “all global states” of the model, myCommandB 
should not be equal to Write if the Write permission in permB[1] is false. 
     TRUE   :  {Wait, Write}; 
Altering the myCommandB‟s default case to result in Wait and Write will test the specification. 
-- specification AG !(permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) IN role1.userEditor is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
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  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
    role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Wait 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandB = Wait 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.userEditor 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.running = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.running = TRUE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Write 
-- specification AG !(permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) IN role1.role3.userIntern is 
false 
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-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Wait 
  role2.userWriter.myCommandB = Wait 
-> Input: 2.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.role3.userIntern 
  running = FALSE 
  role2.userWriter.running = FALSE 
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  role1.role3.userIntern.running = TRUE 
  role1.userEditor.running = FALSE 
-> State: 2.2 <- 
  role1.role3.userIntern.myCommandB = Write 
-- specification AG !(permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) IN role2.userWriter is true 
The model checker determines that editor and intern violates the specification while writer does 
not.  The traces show that both the editor and intern users were not assigned the permission for 
Write, but were still able to have myCommandB equal to Write. 
5.2 Permission Hierarchy 
Permission Hierarchy is the property where if the permissions are arranged in a tier 
system, a user assigned a permission must also receive the permissions in the tiers below it.  
Taking the three permissions of the movie resource as an example, if the user was assigned the 
Copy permission they must also receive the Play permission as well. 
SPEC AG (  (permA[1]) -> (permA[0]) )                                     
The Permission Hierarchy specifications are added to the User module to monitor the 
values of the user permission arrays.  The above CTL statement asks that in “all global states” 
should permA[1] be true implies, represented by the -> symbol, that permA[0] is true as well.  
Thus if the user is assigned the Copy permission, permA[1], they must also have been assigned 
the Play permission, permA[0].  As a counter example, the editorPermA[0]is set to false while 
editorPermA[1] is still true. 
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-- specification AG (permA[1] -> permA[0]) IN role1.userEditor is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[0] = FALSE 
  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[0] = FALSE 
  writerPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
-- specification AG (permA[1] -> permA[0]) IN role1.role3.userIntern is true 
-- specification AG (permA[1] -> permA[0]) IN role2.userWriter is true 
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The model checker reports the intern and writer users followed the specification since 
writer did not have any of the permissions to the movie resource while the intern only had its 
permA[0] set to true and not its permA[1].  The editor user did fail the specification as shown in 
the trace where in state 1.1 the editorPermA[0] is false and editorPermA[1] is true.  This violates 
the specification property and must be fixed in order for editor to pass. 
SPEC AG (  (permA[2]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1]) ) 
The second specification translates that in “all global states” of the model, permA[2] 
equal to true implies that permA[0] and permA[1] must also be true.  Thus if the user was 
assigned the Delete permission, permA[2], they must also have been assigned the Play, 
permA[0], and Copy, permA[1], permissions as well.  As a counterexample, the editor role will 
only be assigned the Delete and Play permissions to the movie resource. 
-- specification AG (permA[2] -> (permA[0] & permA[1])) IN role1.userEditor is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
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  editorPermA[1] = FALSE 
  editorPermA[2] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[0] = FALSE 
  writerPermA[1] = FALSE 
  writerPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userEditor.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
  -- specification AG (permA[2] -> (permA[0] & permA[1])) IN role1.role3.userIntern is true 
-- specification AG (permA[2] -> (permA[0] & permA[1])) IN role2.userWriter is true 
The output of the model checker tells us that the writer and intern roles passed the 
specification since intern only had the Play permission and the writer user did not have any 
permissions at all for the movie resource.  The reason for editor user specification failure is 
displayed in state 1.1 with editorPermA[1] equal to false in violation of the specification since 
the other elements of editorPermA are true. 
SPEC AG (  (permB[1]) -> (permB[0]) ) 
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The last specification is verifying that the permissions to the movieReview variable 
follow the role hierarchy property as well.  The variables of type textFileResource receive the 
user commands of Read and Write.  For the model to adhere to role hierarchy, if the user has the 
Write permission, then the user must also have the Read permission.  The shown CTL statement 
wishes the model checker to verify that in “all global states”, if permB[1] is true implies that 
permB[0] is also true.  Thus if the user has the Write permission, permB[1], then the user must 
also have been assigned the Read permission, permB[0].  As a counterexample, the writer user‟s 
permB[0] is set to false in the main module. 
-- specification AG (permB[1] -> permB[0]) IN role1.userEditor is true 
-- specification AG (permB[1] -> permB[0]) IN role1.role3.userIntern is true 
-- specification AG (permB[1] -> permB[0]) IN role2.userWriter is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermB[0] = FALSE 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
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  writerPermB[0] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[1] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
In state 1.1, roles editor and intern are shown with having false in both elements of their permB 
arrays while writer has true in the higher element and false in the lower element of its permB 
array.  This is in violation of the specification 
 For role hierarchy to be maintained within the account, users given a permission must 
also be assigned the lower permissions as well.  Looking back at the switch statements of the 
myCommand variables in the User module, some of the cases used are in obvious violation of 
this property and should be removed.  Should a user‟s permission arrangements equate to one of 
these faulty cases, they will then be redirected to the default case.  This can lead to a new 
problem since the user was meant to have some permissions assigned to them from their role and 
are supposed to have some form of interaction with the objects.  To prevent any complications, 
each role module is given a set of specification for a specific set of permissions their role must be 
assigned. 
5.3 Minimum Duties 
For a user to accomplish their tasks within a system, they must be assigned the needed 
permissions in order to do so.  A CTL statement is added to each role module that verifies that 
the model has assigned the proper permission arrangements for the user roles. 
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SPEC AG( (internPermA[0] & !internPermA[1] & !internPermA[2]) &(!internPermB[0] 
&!internPermB[1])) 
The intern users in the example model are only supposed to be able to execute Play upon 
the movie resource and nothing more.  The above specification, which is included in the 
internRole module, has the model checker verify that in “all global states” the element in 
internPermA[0] is true while internPermA[1], internPermA[2],  and all of internPermB is false. 
As a counterexample, the intern role will be assigned the Read permission to the movieReview 
resource, internPermB[0], in the editorRole module. 
-- specification AG (((internPermA[0] & !internPermA[1]) & !internPermA[2]) & 
(!internPermB[0] & !internPermB[1])) IN role1.role3 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
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The provided model checker printout shows that the minimum duties specification failed 
for the intern role module.  State 1.1 shows that the intern incorrectly has the Read permission 
for the movieReview article. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[2]) & (!editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1]) ) 
The minimum duties specification of the editor requires the permission of all the 
elements of permA and all the elements of permB to be false.  The above CTL statement 
translates that in “all global states” of the model, the elements of editorPermA[2] is true and that 
element zero and one of editorPermB are false.  The reason that only the second element of 
permA is required in the CTL statement is because permission hierarchy is also followed within 
the model and thus stating the lower two elements is rendered redundant.  To test the 
specification, the editor role is only assigned Play and Copy in the main module. 
-- specification AG (editorPermA[2] & (!editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1])) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
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  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[2] = FALSE 
  editorPermB[0] = FALSE 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
The printed statement, following the failure notification for the specification, shows that the 
editor role has only been assigned the lowest two permissions of the movie resource and thus 
users with an editor role cannot execute the needed commands to accomplish their required 
tasks. 
SPEC AG( (!writerPermA[0] & !writerPermA[1] & !writerPermA[2] ) & (writerPermB[1]) ) 
The writer role in the model is required for the permission of Read and Write to the 
movieReview resource.  Thus the above specification is used to ensure that in “all global states” 
of the model, false is the value of all elements in writerPermA and true in writerPermB[1].  Since 
permission hierarchy must be followed in the model, only writerPermB[1] is needed in the CTL 
statement.  As counterexample, the writer role is also assigned the Play permission, 
writerPermA[0]. 
-- specification AG (((!writerPermA[0] & !writerPermA[1]) & !writerPermA[2]) & 
writerPermB[1]) IN role2 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
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-> State: 1.1 <- 
  writerPermA[0] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[1] = FALSE 
  writerPermA[2] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[0] = TRUE 
  writerPermB[1] = TRUE 
The trace provided by the model checker show that the specification failure is caused by 
the writer role from having its first writerPermA element equal to true and must be to false for 
the model to uphold the minimum duties property of writer. 
5.4 Static Separation of Duties (SSOD) 
SSOD requires that the roles implemented within this system should only have 
permissions to one resource and not the other.  The example model has the editor and intern only 
having permissions to the movie resource while the writer is only able to interact with the 
movieReview resource. 
SPEC AG( (internPermA[0] -> AG !internPermB[0]) | (internPermB[0] ->  AG !internPermB[0]) 
) 
The SSOD specification included in the internRole module has the model checker verify 
that in “all global states” internPermA[0] implies “all global states” of internPermB[0] are false 
or that internPermB[0] implies that “all global states” of internPermB[0] is false.  This CTL 
statement equates to meaning that should the intern user‟s lowest element in either permission 
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array be true then the lowest element in the other array must be false.  Since permission 
hierarchy is followed in the model, only the lowest elements need to be tested.  For a 
counterexample, the intern‟s lowest elements to both permission arrays are set to true in the 
editorRole module. 
- specification AG ((internPermA[0] -> AG !internPermB[0]) | (internPermB[0] -> AG 
!internPermA[0])) IN role1.role3 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
The trace shows that a true value exists in both arrays in violation of the specification and 
requires that one must be set false in order for the model to pass. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[0] -> AG !editorPermB[0]) | (editorPermB[0] ->  AG !editorPermB[0]) 
) 
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SPEC AG( (writerPermA[0] -> AG !writerPermB[0]) & (writerPermB[0] ->  AG 
!writerPermB[0]) ) 
 The editor and writer roles have a near identical formula for their SSOD specification for 
their modules.  The only difference is the variables to be used, the permission arrays to the roles, 
in the CTL statement.  As a counterexample, both roles are given the lowest permission for an 
opposing resource, which is editor‟s editorPermB[0] and writer‟s writerPermA[0]. 
- specification AG ((editorPermA[0] -> AG !editorPermB[0]) | (editorPermB[0] -> AG 
!editorPermB[0])) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[2] = TRUE 
  editorPermB[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
-- specification AG ((writerPermA[0] -> AG !writerPermB[0]) | (writerPermB[0] -> AG 
!writerPermB[0])) IN role2 is false 
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-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
 
  writerPermA[0] = TRUE 
  writerPermA[1] = FALSE 
  writerPermA[2] = FALSE 
  writerPermB[0] = TRUE 
  writerPermB[1] = TRUE 
As expected, the roles‟ SSOD specification fails due to the role being given a permission 
to both resources.  Thus for the model to adhere to SSOD, the roles must have a permission 
arrangement exclusive to only one of the resources. 
5.5 Role Hierarchy 
In order for the model to uphold the role hierarchy property, a superior role must have 
more permissions than its subordinate role.  In this system, the only the editor has a subordinate 
role, the intern.  Since permission hierarchy is implemented within the system as well, the editor 
must have a higher level permission than the intern for the model to pass.  For example, if editor 
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was assigned the Copy permission, the intern must not have an equal, Copy, or higher 
permission, Delete. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[0] & !editorPermA[1]) -> AG !(internPermA[0] ) ) 
 The first role hierarchy specification in the editorRole module requires that in “all global 
states”, editorPermA[0] being true and editorPermA[1] being false implies that in “all global 
states” it should not be possible for internPermA[0] to be true.  The first half of the CTL 
statement is used to determine what the editor role‟s permission level is.  If the editorPermA[0] 
is true and the higher elements are not, then taking into account permission hierarchy editor must 
only have the Play permission.  The second half of the specification is checking that the intern 
does not have the equivalent permission to editor.  The reason that the higher permissions to 
intern‟s arrays are not tested in the specification is due to permission hierarchy implemented 
within the system.  The internPermA[0] can be true either because that permission was assigned 
to the intern role or because a higher permission was assigned.  Either way will violate the 
specification.  As a counterexample, the editor is given only the Play permission in main while 
the intern receives Play and Copy. 
-- specification AG ((editorPermA[0] & !editorPermA[1]) -> AG !(internPermA[0])) IN role1 is 
false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
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  movie.state = Wait 
  movieReview.state = Wait 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[1] = FALSE 
  editorPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
 The trace shows that the specification fails and the cause is due to a higher element of the 
intern role‟s permission array than the editor role‟s. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[1] & !editorPermA[2]) -> AG !(internPermA[1] )  ) 
 The second SSOD specification translates that in “all global states” of the model, 
editorPermA[1] is true and editorPermA[2] is false implies that in “all global states” 
internPermA[1] should be true.  As a counter example, the intern and editor roles will both be 
assigned the Play and Copy permissions. 
-- specification AG ((editorPermA[1] & !editorPermA[2]) -> AG !(internPermA[1])) IN role1 is 
false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
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Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
 The trace shows that the roles‟ permission arrays are equal and thus violate the role 
hierarchy specification requiring that editor role must have a higher permission setting than the 
intern role. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[2]) -> AG !(internPermA[2])) 
 The last specification for the editor role permission to the movie resource checks that in 
“all global states” where editorPermA[2] is true implies that in “all global states” it should not be 
possible for internPermA[2] to be true.  As a counterexample, both editor and intern‟s permA[2] 
is set to true. 
-- specification AG (editorPermA[2] -> AG !internPermA[2]) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
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Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermA[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[1] = TRUE 
  editorPermA[2] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = TRUE 
The trace shows the equality of both the roles‟ permission arrays and thus violates the 
specification.  The permission level of the subordinate role must be lowered in order for the 
model checker to approve of the model. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1]) -> AG !(internPermB[0]) ) 
 The above specification requires the in “all global states” of the model, editorPermB[0] 
being true while editorPermB[1] is false implies that in “all global states” it should not be 
possible for internPermB[0] to be true.  As a counterexample, editorPermB[0] and 
internPermB[0] are set to true. 
-- specification AG ((editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1]) -> AG !internPermB[0]) IN role1 is 
false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
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Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermB[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
  The trace shows that the roles‟ permission arrays to the movie review resource are equal and 
violates the specification. 
SPEC AG( (editorPermB[1]) -> AG !(internPermB[1])) 
 The specification translates that in “all global states” of the model, editorPermB[1] being 
true implies that in “all global states”, internPermB[1] should not be true.  As a counterexample, 
the editor and intern role are once again assigned true to element one of their permB arrays. 
-- specification AG (editorPermB[1] -> AG !internPermB[1]) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
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  editorPermB[0] = TRUE 
  editorPermB[1] = TRUE   
  role1.internPermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = TRUE 
 As expected, assigning both roles the same permission to their permB arrays caused the 
specification to fail and requires that the subordinate role must have their permission array set to 
a lower level. 
 All of the role hierarchy specifications so far have checked that whatever the highest 
permission element to editor role‟s arrays is equal to true requires the intern role‟s highest 
element must be lower in order for the model to pass.  However there is one case that must also 
be tested in the model.  If the editor role does not have any elements equal to true in a permission 
array, the intern role must not have any true elements in that array as well.  Thus if the editor role 
does not have Read, editorPermB[0], or Write, editorPermB[1], to the movieReview resource 
then intern role must not be assigned any permissions either. 
SPEC AG( (!editorPermA[0]) -> AG !(internPermA[0])) 
 The specification above translates that in “all global states” of the model, editorPermA[0] 
equal to false implies that in “all global states” internPermA[0] must false as well.  Thus if the 
editor role does not have the Play permission, editorPermA[0], then the intern role must not have 
the Play permission, internPermA[0], as well.  As a counterexample, editorPermA[0] is set to 
false while internPermA[0] is true. 
-- specification AG (!editorPermA[0] -> AG !internPermA[0]) IN role1 is false 
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-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermA[0] = FALSE 
  editorPermA[1] = FALSE 
  editorPermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermA[2] = FALSE 
 The model checker reports that the specification has failed with the trace showing that the 
cause is because the intern role has the permission to Play for the movie resource, while the 
editor role does not have permission to perform any commands upon the same resource.  In order 
for the model to pass the specification, either the editor role‟s must have a permission higher 
than the intern role or the intern role must not have any permission to the movie resource. 
SPEC AG( (!editorPermB[0]) -> AG !(internPermB[0])) 
 Along with testing when the editor role does not have any permissions to the movie 
resource, a specification must also be included to test when the editor role does not have any 
permissions to the movieReview resource.  The above specification translates that in “all global 
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states” of the model, editorPermB[0] equal to false implies that in “all global states”  
internPermB[0] must also be false.  Thus if the editor does not have the Read permission to 
movieReview, the intern does not have the permission either.  As a counterexample, the 
internRole is assigned the Read permission to movieReview while the editor role has not been 
given the permission. 
-- specification AG (!editorPermB[0] -> AG !internPermB[0]) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  editorPermB[0] = FALSE 
  editorPermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.internPermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.internPermB[1] = FALSE 
 The model checker reports that the specification has failed and the trace shows that 
reason is because the editor role does not have any permission to the movieReview resource 
while its subordinate role, intern, has the Read permission.  In order for the model to pass the 
specification, the editor role must have a higher permission than the intern role to movieReview 
or the intern role must not have any permissions just like the editor role. 
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5.6 Dynamic Separation of Duties (DSOD) 
The SSOD‟s second property concentrates on a user receiving conflicting permissions 
from their roles during a session.  DSOD, however, deliberates upon a user being assigned a pair 
or pairs of conflicting roles.  This is because even though a user‟s current session role may not 
give that user any conflicting permissions, a user may later login with another role and possibly 
giving the user access to permissions that conflict with the last role.  In order to have the model 
checker verify that the model does follow DSOD, a set of specifications must be added for each 
role that conflicts with another role.  In the example model, only the editor and writer roles are in 
conflict with each other. 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[1] -> AG !(givenRoles[2])  ) 
 The first DSOD specification, which is imbedded in the userRoles module, request that 
the model checker verify that in “all global states”, givenRoles[1] being true implies that in “all 
global states” givenRoles[2] should not be true.  The variable givenRoles is used to represent 
what roles the user has been assigned within the system.  The element one is true when the user 
is granted the editor role, and element two is true when the user is granted the writer role.  For 
the model to uphold the specification, the user must not be assigned the writer role while having 
the editor role.  As a counterexample, userJames‟s roles have been altered to allow him all three 
roles of the system. 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[1] -> AG !givenRoles[2]) IN userJames is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
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Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  jamesRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[2] = TRUE 
  brianRoles[0] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[1] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[2] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[1] = FALSE 
  jacobRoles[2] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[0] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[1] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[2] = FALSE 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[1] -> AG !givenRoles[2]) IN userBrian is true 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[1] -> AG !givenRoles[2]) IN userJacob is true 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[1] -> AG !givenRoles[2]) IN userWilly is true 
 93 
 
The model checker reports that all users, except userJames, passed the specification by not 
having the pair of conflicting roles of writer and editor assigned to them.  In order for the model 
to pass, userJames must have one of the roles removed from his assigned set. 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[2] -> AG !(givenRoles[1])  ) 
The second specification included in the userRoles module has the model checker verify 
that when a user is granted the writer role, that they should not have the editor role.  While this 
second CTL statement may seem unnecessary since the first specification would catch the same 
violation, it is included anyway to follow a best practice policy for systems with a larger set of 
user roles.  If the system had a set of ten conflicting roles and a specification for each assists in 
determining the source of the model failure.  If a user is assigned three out of the ten conflicting 
roles, the model checker will report that those three specifications have failed and reveal which 
roles must be removed from the user for the model to pass. 
 As a counterexample, userBrian is assigned the editor role while still having the writer 
role. 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[2] -> AG !givenRoles[1]) IN userJames is true 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[2] -> AG !givenRoles[1]) IN userBrian is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
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  jamesRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[2] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[0] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[1] = TRUE 
  brianRoles[2] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[1] = FALSE 
  jacobRoles[2] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[0] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[1] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[2] = FALSE 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[2] -> AG !givenRoles[1]) IN userJacob is true 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[2] -> AG !givenRoles[1]) IN userWilly is true 
All the other users have passed the specification since they either only has the intern or editor 
roles and not the writer role.  User Brian however causes the model to fail the specification since 
he has been granted both of the conflicting roles.  In order for the model to pass the specification, 
user Brian must only be granted one of the conflicting roles. 
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 While the above specification requires that no user is ever assigned a pair of conflicting 
roles, the example model also requires that multiple users must not be allowed to use role that 
should only be exclusively given to one person. 
SPEC AG (  (  (userJames.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userBrian.activeRole = editor) | 
(userJacob.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
 The above specification asks to model checker to verify that in “all global states” of the 
model, userJames‟s activeRole equal to editor implies that in “all global states” it should not be 
possible for userBrian, userJacob, or userWilly‟s activeRole to be equal to editor.  As a counter 
example userWilly will be assigned the same roles as userJames, both the intern and editor roles. 
-- specification AG (userJames.activeRole = editor -> AG !((userBrian.activeRole = editor | 
userJacob.activeRole = editor) | userWilly.activeRole = editor))  is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  jamesRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[2] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[0] = FALSE 
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  brianRoles[1] = TRUE 
  brianRoles[2] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[1] = FALSE 
  jacobRoles[2] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[0] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[1] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[2] = FALSE 
  userJames.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userBrian.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userJacob.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userWilly.activeRole = loggedOut 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userJames 
  running = FALSE 
  userWilly.running = FALSE 
  userJacob.running = FALSE 
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  userBrian.running = FALSE 
  userJames.running = TRUE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  userJames.activeRole = editor 
-> Input: 1.3 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userWilly 
  userWilly.running = TRUE 
  userJames.running = FALSE 
-> State: 1.3 <- 
  userWilly.activeRole = editor 
The users Brian and Jacob upheld the specification as expected while users James and Willy 
cause the model to fail.  State 1.1 shows that both roles are given the editor role by the variable 
givenRoles[1] being set to true.  The process selector then chooses each conflicting user in order 
to show that user James has logged in as the editor in State1.2 and user Willy was also able to 
log in as the editor in State 1.3.  User Willy must have not been assigned the editor role in order 
for the model checker to approve the model. 
 The specification for the exclusive role is only used to check when userJames is given the 
editor role and verify that no others have as well.  However, if userWilly and userJacob were 
given the editor role and userJames was not, then the model checker will not catch the 
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discrepancy.  Thus each user must the same type of specification that checks to see if multiple 
users are able to log in with the exclusive role. 
SPEC AG (  (  (userBrian.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userJacob.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userJacob.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userBrian.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userWilly.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userBrian.activeRole = editor) | (userJacob.activeRole = editor) ))) 
 As before, each specification asks the model to verify that in “all global states” where a 
user logs in with the editor role, no other user is also able to log in as editor.  When all of these 
specifications are used in conjunction, we receive the same effect with the previous DSOD 
property showing exactly which users are in violation of the specification. To demonstrate, 
James and Jacob are both assigned the editor roles as a counter example. 
-- specification AG (userJames.activeRole = editor -> AG !((userBrian.activeRole = editor | 
userJacob.activeRole = editor) | userWilly.activeRole = editor))  is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  semEditor.sema = FALSE 
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  semEditor.userName = None 
  semWriter.sema = FALSE 
  semWriter.userName = None 
  jamesRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[2] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[0] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[1] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[2] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[2] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[0] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[1] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[2] = FALSE 
  userJames.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userBrian.activeRole = loggedOut 
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  userJacob.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userWilly.activeRole = loggedOut 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userJames 
  running = FALSE 
  userWilly.running = FALSE 
  userJacob.running = FALSE 
  userBrian.running = FALSE 
  userJames.running = TRUE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  userJames.activeRole = editor 
-> Input: 1.3 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userJacob 
  userJacob.running = TRUE 
  userJames.running = FALSE 
-> State: 1.3 <- 
  userJacob.activeRole = editor 
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-- specification AG (userBrian.activeRole = editor -> AG !((userJames.activeRole = editor | 
userJacob.activeRole = editor) | userWilly.activeRole = editor))  is true 
-- specification AG (userJacob.activeRole = editor -> AG !((userJames.activeRole = editor | 
userBrian.activeRole = editor) | userWilly.activeRole = editor))  is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
  semEditor.sema = FALSE 
  semEditor.userName = None 
  semWriter.sema = FALSE 
  semWriter.userName = None 
  jamesRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jamesRoles[2] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[0] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[1] = FALSE 
  brianRoles[2] = TRUE 
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  jacobRoles[0] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[1] = TRUE 
  jacobRoles[2] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[0] = TRUE 
  willyRoles[1] = FALSE 
  willyRoles[2] = FALSE 
  userJames.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userBrian.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userJacob.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userWilly.activeRole = loggedOut 
-> Input: 2.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userJacob 
  running = FALSE 
  userWilly.running = FALSE 
  userJacob.running = TRUE 
  userBrian.running = FALSE 
  userJames.running = FALSE 
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-> State: 2.2 <- 
  userJacob.activeRole = editor 
-> Input: 2.3 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userJames 
  userJacob.running = FALSE 
  userJames.running = TRUE 
-> State: 2.3 <- 
  userJames.activeRole = editor 
-- specification AG (userWilly.activeRole = editor -> AG !((userJames.activeRole = editor | 
userBrian.activeRole = editor) | userJacob.activeRole = editor))  is true 
Only two of the four specifications failed within the model.  The two that pass, Brian and Willy, 
shows that those two users have nothing to do with the exclusive role and can be ruled out during 
the debugging process.  Only users James and Jacob need to be examined, which the trace shows 
both being able to log in as the editor and violate the specification. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Case Study 
A private social network is incorporated into a company‟s project development process.  
The social network account will store all project related materials into its system.  The roles 
within the network are given permissions that allow access and interact with those resources.  
The permissions in each role are determined by what permissions are given to them by a superior 
role.  The organizational hierarchy of the project team has the supervisor setting the permissions 
to each of the section leaders, and the section leaders determine what permissions to each of their 
individual workers. 
The permissions each role should have are based upon what tasks a person with that role 
must complete.  A worker on a project must be able to at least read and write to their section‟s 
project resource, but never to any other.  Section leaders not only have the same resource 
permissions of their workers, but are also the only ones who are able to create documentation for 
their project resource.  Just like their workers, section leaders should never be able to interact 
with any other project but the one they are assigned to.  Unlike all the other roles, the supervisor 
is the only one with all of the permissions to all of the projects stored inside of the account, 
meaning that he/she is able to execute section leader type commands on any project stored in the 
social network account.  The supervisor is also the role that determines which project resource 
each section leader is allowed to work on and is the only role that can set the schedule to those 
projects.  Since the supervisor role has so much influence upon the account, there should only be 
one user given the supervisor role. 
Rules in the policy which applies to this system include: 
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1. There are four permissions for the four possible commands a user can execute upon the 
resources of the social network account.  This includes Read, Write, Document, and 
Schedule. 
2.  A user of the supervisor role must have all of the root permissions to all of the project 
resources. 
3. The supervisor determines which project resource each section leader and workers are 
able to have permissions to. 
4. A user of a section leader role must have the permissions to Read, Write, and Document 
for their assigned project resource and should only be able to assign workers permissions 
to the same project. 
5. A section leader should never be able to execute commands to any other resource but the 
one assigned to them by the supervisor role. 
6. A user of the worker role must be able to Read and Write to a project resource.  Which 
project resource is determined by which section leader is their superior. 
7. Workers should never be able to execute commands to any other project that was not 
assigned to them.  In essence, workers can only have permissions to the same project as 
their section leader. 
8. If a role has a superior role assigning it permissions and resources, these two roles must 
not have the same set of permissions as this makes one of the roles redundant. 
9. When assigning roles to a user, that user must never be assigned roles that will grant 
them access to more than one resource.  The only exception to this rule is if the user is 
also given the supervisor role. 
10. There should only be one user my log in with the supervisor role. 
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Figure 8:  Model Representation of the Case Study. 
6.1 Building the Model 
 Previously in the model checking chapter, it was mentioned that a common difficultly in 
constructing the model is the sheer size of the model itself.  For a social network account, the 
factor that may cause a model to reach an encumbering size is the number of roles and 
permissions within the account and the assigning of those permissions to each role.  Though this 
case study has only nine roles and four permissions to four different resources, it is possible for a 
social network to have any number of roles, permissions and resources.  Creating a model by 
hand can become a lengthy process with human error contributing to the total time to finish the 
model.  In order to shorten the amount of time needed to build the model in the case study and 
lower the opportunity for human error to occur, a Java code generator program was used. 
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 As in the example model, the case study has a separate module to represent each role in 
the social network account.  These role modules all follow the same outline.  First, they are given 
permissions from a superior role.  Second, they declare a user variable to receive these 
permissions and interact with the resources.  If the role modules have subordinate roles, they 
create permission arrays for each role, in the VAR section, and set the values to the arrays in the 
ASSIGN section.  The arrays are then sent to the subordinate role type variables.  Finally after 
the ASSIGN section, the SPEC section contains any property specification that is needed in the 
role module. 
 The process just described is repeated for each role module that exists within the model 
and its uniformity can be used to easily build the model by the code generator program that was 
developed.  The program begins by asking how many resources there will be and what 
permissions users will have to those resources.  Next the program asks how many root roles there 
will be and what are they called.  In this case study there is only one root, the supervisor role, but 
other models may require more.  For each root role that exists, the program will ask which 
permissions to each resource the role will be assigned.  An opportunity is then presented where 
the user is allowed to add any number of specifications to the SPEC section of the module. 
Afterwards, the program asks how many subordinate roles each role has and repeats the above 
process until the roles no longer have subordinate roles. 
 Once all of the model questions of the code generator have been answer, the program will 
then build the described model into a .smv file.  This file will contain all of the modules needed 
to represent the social network account with all of the variables set to the needed values.  Using 
the program as part of the development process allows for the ability to generate a model to 
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represent any size social network account while minimizing the need to tediously manually write 
all of the modules and the variables contained within them. 
6.2 Overview of the SMV Program 
MODULE main 
VAR 
projectA :  Resource(); 
projectB :  Resource(); 
projectC :  Resource(); 
projectD :  Resource(); 
Starting in the main module once again, the variables of the resources are declared with 
the name of the project they will represent, A to D, and with a type specifier of Resource.  
Resource is another module that represents the resources, and the commands that can be 
executed upon the resource, that exist within the model.  ProjectA through projectD are thus 
instances of the Resource module. 
supervisorPermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
supervisorPermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
supervisorPermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
supervisorPermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
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In our case study, the main module begins by passing the four resources to the supervisor 
role and a set of permission arrays for each resource.  Therefore four Boolean arrays are declared 
whose elements will be used to determine what permissions the supervisor role will have for 
each of the Resources.  Thus supervisorPermA contains what permissions the supervisor role has 
for projectA, supervisorPermB for projectB, supervisorPermC for projectC, and 
supervisorPermD for projectD.    The arrays‟ sizes are set in correlation to the possible 
commands the user can send to the resources with zero for Read, one for Write, two for 
Document, and three for Schedule.  So if supervisorPermC[2] is equal to true, then the supervisor 
role is allowed to execute the Document command upon projectC. 
ASSIGN 
supervisorPermA[0] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermA[1] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermA[2] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermA[3] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermB[0] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermB[1] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermB[2] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermB[3] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermC[0] := TRUE; 
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supervisorPermC[1] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermC[2] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermC[3] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermD[0] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermD[1] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermD[2] := TRUE; 
supervisorPermD[3] := TRUE; 
 In our case study, the supervisor role is to have all of the permission to every project 
resource within the network account.  Therefore, all the elements in the permission arrays are set 
to true. 
role1 : Supervisor(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, supervisorPermB, 
supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD); 
  The resources and the now set permission arrays are then used as parameters by the variable 
role1, which is declared as type Supervisor. 
6.3 Modeling the Social Network Account Resources 
MODULE Resource() 
VAR 
state :  {Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
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ASSIGN 
init(state) := {Wait}; 
 
The resource module follows the same outline as the model in the example.  The enumerated 
variable state is declared with the values of Wait, Read, Write, Document, and Schedule for the 
possible commands users may send to the resource.  The variable state is then initialized to the 
value of Wait. 
6.4 Modeling the Social Network Account Roles 
MODULE Supervisor(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, 
supervisorPermB,supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD) 
VAR 
user1 : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, supervisorPermB, 
supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD); 
 The only role module that is initialized in the main module is that of Supervisor, which 
takes as parameters the instances of the network resources paired with permission arrays that 
determine what commands the user with this role will be allowed to execute.  All of these 
variables are then given to the user1 variable which models a user, with a supervisor role, 
interacting with the system resources.  User1 is declared with its type specifier as the User 
module and uses the same parameters given to the role by main as arguments.  In the case study, 
the supervisor dictates the permissions assigned to the four section leaders.  Thus the supervisor 
module will need a set of Boolean permission arrays for each subordinate role to the supervisor. 
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sectApermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectApermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectApermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectApermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
 
sectBpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectBpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectBpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectBpermD : array 0..3 of boolean;  
 
sectCpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectCpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectCpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectCpermD : array 0..3 of boolean;  
 
sectDpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectDpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
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sectDpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
sectDpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
 
In the Var section, four by four sets of permission arrays are declared.  The sixteen arrays equate 
to the need of four separate roles needing permission arrays to the four individual resources.  To 
help differentiate which arrays go to which roles, the variable names are based upon the section 
they will be sent to and the resource it is for.  For example, sectDpermA refers to it belonging to 
the section leader D and that it is the permission array to project resource A.  The elements to 
each array must then be set based on the permissions each section leader requires in the case 
study. 
 
 
ASSIGN   
sectApermA[0] := TRUE; 
sectApermA[1] := TRUE; 
sectApermA[2] := TRUE; 
sectApermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectApermB[0] := FALSE; 
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sectApermB[1] := FALSE; 
sectApermB[2] := FALSE; 
sectApermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectApermC[0] := FALSE; 
sectApermC[1] := FALSE; 
sectApermC[2] := FALSE; 
sectApermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectApermD[0] := FALSE; 
sectApermD[1] := FALSE; 
sectApermD[2] := FALSE; 
sectApermD[3] := FALSE; 
The leader of section A must be able use the commands of Read, Write, and Document to only 
project resource A.  Thus the first three elements of array sectApermA are set to true and all the 
other resource permission arrays are set to false.  The Schedule command is only available to the 
role of Supervisor and thus element four of the sectApermA is false.  The permission arrays for 
the other sections follow the same pattern.  Each section will only have the values of the first 
three elements if their required project resource set to true and all others will be false.  Thus 
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section leader B will have the permissions for project B, leader C for project C, and leader D for 
project D. 
sectBpermA[0] := FALSE; 
sectBpermA[1] := FALSE; 
sectBpermA[2] := FALSE; 
sectBpermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectBpermB[0] := TRUE; 
sectBpermB[1] := TRUE; 
sectBpermB[2] := TRUE; 
sectBpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectBpermC[0] := FALSE; 
sectBpermC[1] := FALSE; 
sectBpermC[2] := FALSE; 
sectBpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectBpermD[0] := FALSE; 
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sectBpermD[1] := FALSE; 
sectBpermD[2] := FALSE; 
sectBpermD[3] := FALSE; 
The leader of section B must be able use the commands of Read, Write, and Document to only 
project resource B.  Thus the first three elements of array sectBpermB are set to true and all the 
other resource permission arrays are set to false.  The Schedule command is only available to the 
role of Supervisor and thus element four of the sectBpermB is false. 
sectCpermA[0] := FALSE; 
sectCpermA[1] := FALSE; 
sectCpermA[2] := FALSE; 
sectCpermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectCpermB[0] := FALSE; 
sectCpermB[1] := FALSE; 
sectCpermB[2] := FALSE; 
sectCpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectCpermC[0] := TRUE; 
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sectCpermC[1] := TRUE; 
sectCpermC[2] := TRUE; 
sectCpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectCpermD[0] := FALSE; 
sectCpermD[1] := FALSE; 
sectCpermD[2] := FALSE; 
sectCpermD[3] := FALSE; 
The leader of section C must be able use the commands of Read, Write, and Document to only 
project resource C.  Thus the first three elements of array sectCpermC are set to true and all the 
other resource permission arrays are set to false.  The Schedule command is only available to the 
role of Supervisor and thus element four of the sectCpermC is false. 
 
sectDpermA[0] := FALSE; 
sectDpermA[1] := FALSE; 
sectDpermA[2] := FALSE; 
sectDpermA[3] := FALSE; 
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sectDpermB[0] := FALSE; 
sectDpermB[1] := FALSE; 
sectDpermB[2] := FALSE; 
sectDpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectDpermC[0] := FALSE; 
sectDpermC[1] := FALSE; 
sectDpermC[2] := FALSE; 
sectDpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
sectDpermD[0] := TRUE; 
sectDpermD[1] := TRUE; 
sectDpermD[2] := TRUE; 
sectDpermD[3] := FALSE; 
The leader of section D must be able use the commands of Read, Write, and Document to only 
project resource D.  Thus the first three elements of array sectDpermD are set to true and all the 
other resource permission arrays are set to false.  The Schedule command is only available to the 
role of Supervisor and thus element four of the sectDpermD is false. 
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userLeaderA : sectionLeaderA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, 
sectApermB, sectApermC, sectApermD); 
userLeaderB : sectionLeaderB(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectBpermA, 
sectBpermB, sectBpermC, sectBpermD); 
userLeaderC : sectionLeaderC(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectCpermA, 
sectCpermB, sectCpermC, sectCpermD); 
userLeaderD : sectionLeaderD(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectDpermA, 
sectDpermB, sectDpermC, sectDpermD); 
After all sixteen elements to the permission arrays have been assigned, they are passed 
with the resources as parameters to the variables userLeaderA, userLeaderB, userLeaderC, and 
userLeaderD.  These variables are declared with a type specifier of a sectionLeader_ module.  
Nominally, having a single type of module used for all four variables would be preferable for 
this program.  However, the permissions passed from a section leader to their subordinates will 
be unique to their section and thus requires a separate role module for each section. 
MODULE sectionLeaderA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, 
sectApermB,sectApermC, sectApermD) 
VAR 
userLeaderA : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, sectApermB, 
sectApermC, sectApermD); 
workerpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
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workerpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
workerpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
workerpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
 
 Module sectionLeaderA receives the project resources and permission array variables 
from the supervisor role and passes them on to the userLeaderA variable that represents a user 
with the leaderA role sending commands to the resources.  In the case study, each section leader 
also has a subordinate worker whose permissions they must arrange for their role.  The VAR 
section thus includes a set of permission arrays to be passed for the workerA role. 
ASSIGN 
workerpermA[0]    := TRUE; 
workerpermA[1]    := TRUE; 
workerpermA[2]    := FALSE; 
workerpermA[3]    := FALSE; 
The worker for section leader A is only to be allowed to Read and Write for projectA and 
therefore, only the lowest two elements of workerpermA are set to true.  Remaining elements to 
this array and all other arrays must then contain false since this worker should not be allowed to 
send any of those commands to the other network projects. 
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workerForA : workerA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, workerpermB, 
workerpermC, workerpermD); 
The new permission arrays and resources will then be used as parameters for the workerForA 
variable, which is an instance of the workerA module, in the VAR section. 
The modules sectionLeaderB, sectionLeaderC, and sectionLeaderD all have a similar 
layout to sectionLeaderA above.  The differences are the permission array settings for their 
workers.  The workers for sectionLeaderB only have the first two elements to projectB set to 
true, those of sectionLeaderC have the two elements to projectC and sectionLeaderD‟s workers 
have the two elements for projectD. 
MODULE workerA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB,workerpermC, workerpermD) 
VAR 
userWorkerA : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB, workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 Since none of the workers have a subordinate role to set permissions for, the module will 
just take the parameters sent to it by the sectionLeader modules and use them as parameters for 
the userWorker variable that is an instance of the User module. 
6.5 Modeling User Interaction with the Project Resources 
MODULE User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, permA, permB, permC, permD) 
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 In the case study, users will be interacting with four different project resources with the 
commands they are allowed to send based upon the values within their given permission array 
elements.  Thus the User module will take as parameters the four account resources, and the 
permission arrays that were sent from a role module. 
VAR 
myCommandA : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
myCommandB : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
myCommandC : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
myCommandD : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
 
ASSIGN 
init(myCommandA) := Wait; 
init(myCommandB) := Wait; 
init(myCommandC) := Wait; 
init(myCommandD) := Wait; 
 Since there are four resources, there must be four myCommand variables declared in the 
VAR section and have their initial state set to Wait in the ASSIGN section of the module. 
next(myCommandA) := case 
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                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = FALSE) & (permA[2] = FALSE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read}; 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = FALSE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE)  : {Wait,Read, Write}; 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = TRUE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE)  : {Wait,Read, Write,Document}; 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = TRUE) & 
(permA[3] = TRUE) : {Wait,Read, Write,Document, Schedule}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
   esac; 
The next function for the commands will once again be determined by a case expression.  
Unlike the previous example, the case study requires that whatever permission the user is given 
must also receive the lower permissions as well.  That is accomplished in our model by arranging 
the cases so that each element has a case where it is true and only the lower elements are true 
too.  Thus if the user has the Document permission, permA[3]=TRUE, then all the elements less 
than three must also be true in permA.  The default statement is still the same and is used 
whenever the user does not have any permission array elements with a true value. 
 
  next(ResourceA.state) :=  
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   case 
   myCommandA != Wait : myCommandA; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
Once the myCommand variables are set, their values will be used to determine what the next 
state of the related resources will become. 
Modeling the User Session Roles 
 In order to test the dynamic changes to a user‟s role in the account, four users are 
modeled to each have a leader role, with one of the leaders also given the supervisor role, and its 
subordinate worker role.  The user with the supervisor role is will also be granted all roles 
implemented by the social network account. 
   simonRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   milesRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   sarahRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   buddyRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
 In VAR of the main module, the four named userRoles variables shown above are 
Boolean arrays of ten elements.  If an element is true in the array, then the named user is allowed 
to login as that role.  Elements zero through three correspond to the workerA, workerB, 
workerC, and workerD roles.  Elements four through seven correspond to the leaderA, leaderB, 
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leaderC, and leaderD roles.  Finally, if element nine‟s value is set to true, it represents that the 
user is allowed to log in as the supervisor.  
  simonRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[2] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[3] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[4] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[5] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[6] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[7] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[8] := TRUE; 
 
  milesRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  milesRoles[2] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[3] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[5] := TRUE; 
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  milesRoles[6] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[7] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[8] := FALSE; 
 
  sarahRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[2] := TRUE; 
  sarahRoles[3] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[5] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[6] := TRUE; 
  sarahRoles[7] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[8] := FALSE; 
 
  buddyRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[2] := FALSE; 
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  buddyRoles[3] := TRUE; 
  buddyRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[5] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[6] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[7] := TRUE; 
  buddyRoles[8] := FALSE; 
In the case study, Simon is selected to be the supervisor of the account while Miles, 
Sarah, and Buddy are given the roles of LeaderB, LeaderC, and LeaderD.  In the above ASSIGN 
section, milesRoles second and fifth elements are set to true in order to assign Miles the worker 
and LeaderB roles.  Sarah‟s array has only the third and sixth elements set to true in order for her 
to login as workerC or as LeaderC and all but the third and seventh elements are false for 
Buddy‟s roles array so that he may login as workerD or as LeaderD.  Simon roles array is true in 
all elements since he is the supervisor of the account, and thus is allowed to login with any role 
of his choosing. 
In the case study, the leader and supervisor roles are to only be used by one user at a time 
in the social network.  Thus a semaphore is needed for each role. 
   semLA : semaphore(); 
   semLB : semaphore(); 
   semLC : semaphore(); 
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   semLD : semaphore(); 
   semS : semaphore(); 
The above five variables are semaphores for each of the leader roles and one for the supervisor 
role.  These variables are declared with a type specifier of the semaphore module that takes no 
parameters. 
MODULE semaphore() 
VAR 
   sema : boolean; 
   userName : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(sema) := FALSE; 
   init(userName) := None; 
The semaphore module is nearly identical to the one in the example model.  The only difference 
is that the enumeration of userName was changed to the users represented in this system. 
   name1 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name2 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name3 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name4 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
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As in the example model, the name of each user must be stored into a variable in the 
VAR section of main.  The value of that variable will be used by the semaphores to track which 
user activated the semaphore. 
  name1 := Simon; 
  name2 := Miles; 
  name3 := Sarah; 
  name4 := Buddy; 
The ASSIGN section will then set each variable to a value that is not used by any of the other 
name variables. 
   userSimon : process userSessionss( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, simonRoles, 
name1); 
   userMiles : process userSessionss( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, milesRoles, 
name2); 
   userSarah : process userSessionss( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, sarahRoles, 
name3); 
   userBuddy : process userSessionss( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, buddyRoles, 
name4); 
 The main module will finally take all the semaphores, the pairs of the named roles arrays, 
the name variables, and uses them as parameters for a named user variable with a type specifier 
of the userSessions module. 
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MODULE userSessions(semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, givenRoles, myName) 
VAR 
   activeRole : {loggedOut, workerA, workerB, workerC, workerD, leaderA, leaderB, leaderC, 
leaderD, supervisor}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(activeRole) := {loggedOut}; 
The case study‟s userRoles module is shown above with a near same layout of parameters 
as the example model.  It receives as parameters the semaphore, the userRoles variable, and the 
name variables from main.  The enumerated variable activeRole, whose possible values are the 
roles of the social network account, represents the user‟s current role during a session.  
ActiveRole may also have the value loggedOut to represent the user leaving a session.  The 
initial value of activeRole is set to loggedOut until the user‟s roles array can be examined. 
   next(activeRole) := case 
   (givenRoles[8] & !semS.sema) : {supervisor}; 
   (givenRoles[7] & !semLD.sema) : {leaderD}; 
   (givenRoles[6] & !semLC.sema) : {leaderC}; 
   (givenRoles[5] & !semLB.sema) : {leaderB}; 
   (givenRoles[4] & !semLA.sema) : {leaderA}; 
   (givenRoles[3]) : {workerD}; 
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   (givenRoles[2]) : {workerC}; 
   (givenRoles[1]) : {workerB}; 
   (givenRoles[0]) : {workerA}; 
   TRUE : loggedOut; 
   esac; 
 Similar to the example model‟s next functions of the userRoles module, the case study‟s 
next value of activeRole is based upon the values of the user‟s givenRoles array elements and the 
semaphore of the exclusive roles. 
  next(semS.sema) := case 
     activeRole = supervisor : TRUE; 
     activeRole != supervisor & semS.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semS.userName) := case 
     activeRole = supervisor : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 132 
 
 Following the example model‟s procedure, if the user log in with an exclusive role the 
semaphore‟s sema variable is set to True and the userName variable is equal to the value stored 
in myName.  When the user changes roles, sema is changed back into false and the value of 
userName reverts to None. 
6.6 Case Study Access Control Specifications 
 The access control properties for the case study will follow the same temporal logic 
formula of the example model from before.  The main differences will be the fact that the 
number of permissions, the type of permissions, and number of resources whose access control 
must be verified. 
SPEC AG ! (permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[3] = FALSE & myCommandA = Schedule) 
 
 
SPEC AG ! (permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[2] = FALSE & myCommandB = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[3] = FALSE & myCommandB = Schedule) 
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SPEC AG ! (permC[0] = FALSE & myCommandC = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[1] = FALSE & myCommandC = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[2] = FALSE & myCommandC = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[3] = FALSE & myCommandC = Schedule) 
 
 
SPEC AG ! (permD[0] = FALSE & myCommandD = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[1] = FALSE & myCommandD = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[2] = FALSE & myCommandD = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[3] = FALSE & myCommandD = Schedule) 
 
Unlike the example model, all four project resources take the same type of commands 
from the users and thus the specifications for each permission array will be identical.  Taking the 
specifications to the permission arrays element zero as an example, the specifications work by 
having the model checker verify that in “all global states”, if the user does not have the Read 
permission to the project resource, then the user‟s myCommand cannot be set to Read. 
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     TRUE   :  {Wait, Read}; 
  As a counterexample, the default case of next(myCommandD) is changed to allow the 
next value to be either Wait or Read.  Originally, the only users‟ able to have their 
myCommandD equal to Read were those with a True value in their permission array.  These 
users were the ones assigned the roles of supervisor, workerD, and leaderD and this alteration 
will now allow any user to use the command upon projectD. 
-- specification AG !(permD[0] = FALSE & myCommandD = Read) IN 
role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[2] = FALSE 
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  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[0] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[0] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandA = Wait 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandB = Wait 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandC = Wait 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandD = Wait 
  -> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA 
  running = FALSE 
  role1.userSupervisor.running = FALSE 
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-> State: 1.2 <- 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandD = Read 
 As expected the Read specifications for all myCommands, except myCommandD, 
was followed within the model.  The supervisor, workerD, and LeaderD roles were the only ones 
who followed the specification since they originally were given the permission and would not 
have used the default case of next(myCommandD).  The workerA, workerB, workerC, leaderA, 
leaderB, and leaderC roles failed the specification since the users of those roles were able to still 
send the Read command while not having the permission.  As shown above, the user with the 
workerA role failed the specification since they were not given the Read permission from their 
superior, as shown in role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[0] = FALSE from State1.1, but was still 
able to have myCommandD set to Read, as shown in the 
role1.userLeaderA.workerForA.userWorkerA.myCommandD = Read from state 1.2.  In order 
for the model to pass these access control specifications, the user‟s ability to execute commands 
must be based upon the permissions given to them by their superiors. 
6.7 Case Study Permission Hierarchy Specifications 
 In order for the case study model to follow permission hierarchy, when a user is given a 
permission to a resource they must also be given all the lower permissions as well.  The users 
have four permissions that will grant them access to the four project resources in the social 
network account which are as follows in ascending order:  Read, Write, Document, and 
Schedule.  As an example of the permission hierarchy, if a user is granted the Document 
permission they must also be assigned Read and Write. 
SPEC AG (  (permA[1]) -> (permA[0]) )                                                                     
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SPEC AG (  (permA[2]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permA[3]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permB[1]) -> (permB[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permB[2]) -> (permB[0] & permB[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permB[3]) -> (permB[0] & permB[1] & permB[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permC[1]) -> (permC[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permC[2]) -> (permC[0] & permC[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permC[3]) -> (permC[0] & permC[1] & permC[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permD[1]) -> (permD[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permD[2]) -> (permD[0] & permD[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permD[3]) -> (permD[0] & permD[1] & permD[2]) )        
The above specifications are included in the User module to verify that permission 
hierarchy is followed in the model.  Each set of specifications focuses on one resource 
permission array.  As in the example model, each specification has the model checker verify that 
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an element of a permission array being true implies that all lower elements of that array are true 
as well. 
As a counterexample, LeaderB will assign workerB only the Write permission to 
projectB, permB[1],  but without the Read permission, permB[0]. 
-- specification AG (permB[1] -> permB[0]) IN role1.userLeaderB.workerForB.userWorkerB is 
false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[3] = FALSE 
The model checker reports that only workerB did not pass the permission hierarchy of its permB 
arrays.  The trace shows that leader has set only workerB‟s Write permission but not its Read 
permission, and thus violates the specification. 
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6.8 Case Study Minimum Duties Specification 
 All the roles of the case study are to be assigned the smallest set of permissions needed 
by the users of those roles to accomplish their required tasks.  The case study requires that the 
supervisor role must be assigned all resource permissions, section leaders are only assigned the 
Read, Write, and Document permissions to one of the project resources and the workers must 
only have the Read and Write to the same project resources as their section leaders. 
SPEC AG( (workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] &!workerpermB[2]) | 
(workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2]) | (workerpermD[1] & !workerpermD[2])) 
 The above specification is added to the workerA, workerB, workerC, and workerD 
modules.  The CTL logic has the model checker verify that in “all global states” one of the 
following conditions must be true:  The Write permission of projectA resource, permA[1], is true 
while the Document permission of projectA resource,permA[2], is false;  The Write permission 
of projectB resource, permB[1], is true while the Document permission of projectB resource, 
permB[2], is false;  The Write permission of projectC resource, permC[1], is true while the 
Document permission of projectC resource,permC[2], is false;  The Write permission of projectD 
resource, permD[1], is true while the Document permission of projectD resource, permD[2], is 
false. 
Though the case study requires that both Read and Write are always given to the worker 
roles, the specification only needs the one element to verify the permission assignment.  
Permission hierarchy is also enforced by the model and thus if the user is given the Write 
permission, element one of the permission array, they must also have received the Read 
permission as well, element zero of the permission array. 
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 As a counterexample, the workerC will be assigned the Read, Write, and Document 
permissions of the projectC resource. 
-- specification AG ((((workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermB[2])) | (workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2])) | (workerpermD[1] & 
!workerpermD[2])) IN role1.userLeaderC.workerForC is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.userLeaderC.workerpermC[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderC.workerpermC[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderC.workerpermC[2] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderC.workerpermC[3] = FALSE 
 The output from the model checker states that the workerC role did not pass the 
minimum duties requirement.  The trace shows that the LeaderC role has not only assigned Read, 
workerpermC[0], and Write, workerpermC[1], of projectC resource to the subordinate workerC 
role, but as also unnecessarily given the Document permission, workerpermC[2], as well.  For 
the model to adhere to the minimum duties specification, the workers must only be assigned the 
required permissions, Read and Write. 
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 SPEC AG( (sectApermA[2] & !sectApermA[3]) | (sectApermB[2] &!sectApermB[3]) | 
(sectApermC[2] & !sectApermC[3]) | (sectApermD[2] & !sectApermD[3])) 
 The section leaders‟ minimum duties specification is the same formula as the workers, 
except that the elements are incremented by one to represent the lowest permission needed, 
element two for Document.  Above is the specification implemented in the section leaderA 
module.  As a counterexample, the supervisor will only be assigned the permissions of Read to 
the projectA resource to section leader A. 
-- specification AG ((((sectApermA[2] & !sectApermA[3]) | (sectApermB[2] & 
!sectApermB[3])) | (sectApermC[2] & !sectApermC[3])) | (sectApermD[2] & !sectApermD[3])) 
IN role1.userLeaderA is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.sectApermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermA[3] = FALSE 
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 The printout of the model checker reports that role module of leaderA has failed the 
specification.  The reason show the reason being that the supervisor has only given leaderA the 
Read permission, role1.sectApermA[0], while the minimum requirement for leaderA include the 
elements one and two.  The supervisor‟s permission assignment must be corrected in order for 
the model pass the minimum duties specification. 
 SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[3]) & (supervisorPermB[3]) & (supervisorPermC[3]) & 
(supervisorPermD[3])) 
 The supervisor role‟s minimum duties specification is the simplest of all the roles.  It 
requires all of the permissions to every project resource.  Remembering that permission 
hierarchy is implemented by the model, all that is require of the specification is the highest 
permission, Schedule, of each resource permission array.  If the role has the Schedule 
permission, then they must have also been assigned all the lower permissions as well.  Thus the 
above specification requires that in “all global states” the value of true must be in the permission 
arrays for Schedule, element three, for every permission array. 
 As a counterexample, the supervisor role is not assigned the Schedule permission for 
projectC in the main module. 
-- specification AG (((supervisorPermA[3] &supervisorPermB[3]) &supervisorPermC[3]) 
&supervisorPermD[3]) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
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-> State: 1.1 <- 
supervisorPermA[0] = TRUE 
supervisorPermA[1] = TRUE 
supervisorPermA[2] = TRUE 
supervisorPermA[3] = TRUE 
supervisorPermB[0] = TRUE 
supervisorPermB[1] = TRUE 
supervisorPermB[2] = TRUE 
supervisorPermB[3] = TRUE 
supervisorPermC[0] = TRUE 
supervisorPermC[1] = TRUE 
supervisorPermC[2] = TRUE 
supervisorPermC[3] = FALSE 
supervisorPermD[0] = TRUE 
supervisorPermD[1] = TRUE 
supervisorPermD[2] = TRUE 
supervisorPermD[3] = TRUE 
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 The model checker printout reports that the supervisor‟s minimum duties specification 
was not upheld by the model.  The following trace shows that the cause of the failure was due to 
supervisor‟s Schedule permission for projectC, supervisorPermC[3], was not set to true in main.  
In order for the model checker to pass the model, the supervisor role module must be granted the 
highest level permission to all project resources. 
6.9 Case Study SSOD Specifications 
 SSOD requires that certain permissions must be exclusively assigned in order to prevent 
a user from having a pair of conflicting permissions.  In this case study, the section leaders and 
their workers must only have permissions for one project resource in order to avoid a conflict.  
The only exception is that of the supervisor role who is allowed to have all of the permissions to 
every resource. 
SPEC AG(( (workerpermA[1]) -> AG (!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermB[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermC[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermD[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermC[1]) )) 
 The above specification is the SSOD specification included in all of the worker role 
modules.  The CTL statement has the model checker verify that in “all global states” of the 
worker role modules, one of the following is true.  The first statement implies that should the 
element of workerpermA[1] being true, that in “all global states” it should not be possible for 
workerpermB[1] or workerpermC[1] or workerpermD[1] to be true.  The reason why only the 
Write permission is used in the logic is because the minimum duties property requires that the 
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highest permission workers should receive is Write.  The second, third and fourth statements 
have the same formula but with a different resource permission array as the subject.  This 
effectively ensures that should a worker role receive the Write permission of a project resource, 
they must only have permissions to that one project resource.  To demonstrate, leaderB will 
assign the workerB role the Read and Write permissions to both projectB and projectC. 
-- specification AG ((((workerpermA[1] -> AG ((!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1]) & 
!workerpermD[1])) & (workerpermB[1] -> AG ((!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1]) & 
!workerpermD[1]))) & (workerpermC[1] -> AG ((!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1]) & 
!workerpermD[1]))) & (workerpermD[1] -> AG ((!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1]) & 
!workerpermC[1]))) IN role1.userLeaderB.workerForB is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermB[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermC[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderB.workerpermC[1] = TRUE 
 The model checker prints out that workerB has failed the SSOD specification and the 
trace provided shows that worker has the Read and Write permissions to both projectB and 
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projectC resources.  In order for the model to pass the specification, the worker must only be 
assigned the minimum duties permissions to one resource. 
SPEC AG(( (sectApermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectApermC[2] & !sectApermD[2])) 
& ((sectApermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermC[2] & !sectApermD[2])) & 
((sectApermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2] & !sectApermD[2])) & 
((sectApermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2] & !sectApermC[2]) )) 
 The section leaders‟ SSOD specification follows the same layout as their worker roles.  
Above is the specification included in the section leaderA module.  All the other section leader 
modules‟ CTL statement will be identical except for the name of the permission array.  However, 
the leaders‟ minimum duties requirements has element two of the permission arrays, Document, 
analyzed in the CTL statement.  As a counterexample, leaderA will be assigned the Read, Write, 
and Document permissions to both projectA and projectD resources. 
-- specification AG ((((sectApermA[2] -> AG ((!sectApermB[2] & !sectApermC[2]) & 
!sectApermD[2])) & (sectApermB[2] -> AG ((!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermC[2]) & 
!sectApermD[2]))) & (sectApermC[2] -> AG ((!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2]) & 
!sectApermD[2]))) & (sectApermD[2] -> AG ((!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2]) & 
!sectApermC[2]))) IN role1.userLeaderA is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
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  role1.sectApermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[2] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermD[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermD[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermD[2] = TRUE 
 The model checker reports that leaderA has failed the SSOD specification implemented 
within its module.  The trace displays that leaderA has been assigned the minimum duties 
permissions to not only projectA but also projectD as well.  In order for the model to pass the 
specification, each leader role must only have permissions to one resource. 
 In the model checking chapter, it was possible for a faulty model to pass its specifications 
when analyzed through the model checker.  This is due to specifications that were not designed 
to properly discover the flaws of the model and have the model checker report it.  This scenario 
is possible in the currently discussed SSOD specifications, which requires that users of certain 
roles are granted exclusive access to a single resource and that no others have the same access, 
except the user with the supervisor role.  So far, the leader roles and worker roles have a SSOD 
specification in which the model will only pass if the roles are only assigned permissions to one 
resource.  These specifications have worked to discover any arrangements that allow users of 
these roles access to multiple resources.  The one flaw of the specification is that it only operates 
within the scope of the modules and does not know if different roles are given access to the same 
single resource.  For example, if roles leaderB and leaderD were both given the section leader 
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minimum duties permissions to only projectD resource the model would still pass.  Even though 
the SSOD has obviously failed, since two different user roles have access to the same resource, 
the model checker would not discover the flaw with the current specification.  This is because 
the scope of the specifications is only within the role modules they were implemented in and do 
not analyze the permissions to the other roles. 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermA[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    
&((sectCpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectBpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    &    
((sectDpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectBpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2]))  ) 
 In order for the model checker to discover this breach in SSOD, the above of 
specification is implemented in the supervisor role module.  Similar to the SSOD inside of each 
leader role module, this specification analyze the all of the section leaders‟ Document permission 
to the projectA resource.  The CTL statement has the model checker verify that in “all global 
states” of the model only one of the following may be true: 
 leaderA‟s being assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectApermA[2], 
implies that in “all global states” leaderB, leaderC, and leaderD have not been 
assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectBpermA[2], sectCpermA[2], 
sectDpermA[2]. 
 leaderB‟s being assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectBpermA[2], 
implies that in “all global states” leaderA, leaderC, and leaderD have not been 
assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectApermA[2], sectCpermA[2], 
sectDpermA[2]. 
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 leaderC‟s being assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectCpermA[2], 
implies that in “all global states” leaderA, leaderB, and leaderD have not been 
assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectApermA[2], sectBpermA[2], 
sectDpermA[2]. 
 leaderD‟s being assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectDpermA[2], 
implies that in “all global states” leaderA, leaderB, and leaderC have not been 
assigned the Document permission to projectA, sectApermA[2], sectBpermA[2], 
sectDpermA[2]. 
The specification will thus ensure that each of the section leaders may have their minimum 
duties assigned to only one project resource with assurances that no other leader has been given 
access to the same project. 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermB[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    &    
((sectCpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    &    
((sectDpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2]))  ) 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermC[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    &    
((sectCpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    &    
((sectDpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2]))  ) 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermD[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    
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&((sectCpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    &    
((sectDpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2]))  ) 
 The other SSOD specifications following the first follow the same format, but focus on a 
different permission array.  The first one above is ensuring that projectB is not accessed by 
multiple leaders, while the second and last are specifications to projectC and projectD. 
 As a counterexample, roles leaderC and leaderD will be granted the Read, Write, and 
Document permissions to only the resource projectD. 
-- specification AG ((((sectApermD[2] -> AG ((!sectBpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2]) & 
!sectDpermD[2])) & (sectBpermD[2] -> AG ((!sectApermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2]) & 
!sectDpermD[2]))) & (sectCpermD[2] -> AG ((!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2]) & 
!sectDpermD[2]))) & (sectDpermD[2] -> AG ((!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2]) & 
!sectCpermD[2]))) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.sectCpermD[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectCpermD[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectCpermD[2] = TRUE 
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  role1.sectDpermD[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectDpermD[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectDpermD[2] = TRUE 
The model checker reports that the specification involving the section leaders‟ access to projectD 
resource has failed.  The trace shows the reason being that section leaderC and leaderD both 
have leader role access to projectD.  In order for the model to pass the specifications, the 
supervisor must assign each leader roles access to only one leader role. 
 Though needed for the section leader roles, a similar set of specifications is not needed to 
verify that the worker roles have access to only one resource.  This is due to the leader roles‟ role 
hierarchy specification, which ensures that whatever single resource the leaders have access to 
their subordinate roles may only have access to the same resource. 
6.10 Case Study Role Hierarchy Specifications 
 In the case study, there are two sets of permission assignments in which role hierarchy 
must be established.  When the supervisor assigns permissions to each of the section leader roles 
and when each section leader role assigns permissions to their subordinate worker roles.  In order 
for the model to adhere to role hierarchy, the superior roles of the interaction must always have a 
higher level of permission than those of the lower roles. 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermA[0]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[0] & !sectApermA[1]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
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SPEC AG( (sectApermA[1] & !sectApermA[2]) -> AG !(workerpermA[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[2] & !sectApermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[3])) 
In order for the model checker to discover a breach in the role hierarchy of the account 
roles between the section leader roles and their worker roles, the above of specifications are 
implemented in section leaderA role module. These specifications have the model checker verify 
that in “all global states” of the model, one of the following cases must be true: 
 The leaderA role not being assigned the Read permission to projectA, 
!sectApermA[0], implies that in “all global states” its worker must not have the 
Read permission to projectA, !(workerpermA[0]). 
 The leaderA role being assigned the Read permission to projectA, 
sectApermA[0], but not the Write permission, sectApermA[1],  implies that in 
“all global states” its worker must not have the Read permission to projectA, 
!(workerpermA[0]). 
 The leaderA role being assigned the Write permission to projectA, 
sectApermA[1], but not the Document permission, sectApermA[2],  implies that 
in “all global states” its worker must not have the Write permission to projectA, 
!(workerpermA[1]). 
 The leaderA role being assigned the Document permission to projectA, 
sectApermA[2], but not the Schedule permission, sectApermA[3],  implies that in 
“all global states” its worker must not have the Document permission to projectA, 
!(workerpermA[2]). 
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 The leaderA role being assigned the Schedule permission to projectA, 
sectApermA[3], implies that in “all global states” its worker must not have the 
Schedule permission to projectA, !(workerpermA[3]). 
The structure of the specification set assists in determining what the permission hierarchy 
level of the leader roles is.  Which specification used is entirely based upon the permissions 
assigned to the section leaders from the supervisor.  In this case study, the CTL statement where 
the section leaders receive the Document permission and not the Schedule permission is the 
specification that will be used.  However, the rest are added anyway since the permissions of the 
roles may be changed during a project development and thus having all possible combinations of 
the role hierarchy included already will remove the needed to redevelop the role hierarchy 
specifications. 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermB[0]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[0] & !sectApermB[1]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[1] & !sectApermB[2]) -> AG !(workerpermB[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[2] & !sectApermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermC[0]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[0] & !sectApermC[1]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[1] & !sectApermC[2]) -> AG !(workerpermC[1]) ) 
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SPEC AG( (sectApermC[2] & !sectApermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermD[0]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[0] & !sectApermD[1]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[1] & !sectApermD[2]) -> AG !(workerpermD[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[2] & !sectApermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[3])) 
 The specification sets following the first follow the same CTL logic as before, except that 
each set analyzes a different permission array.  The first is for the section leaderA‟s permissions 
to projectB, the second is to projectC, and the last is to projectD.  The other section leader 
modules have a near identical set of specifications of their own.  The only difference is the first 
half of the permission array name used to represent what section the array was sent to. 
As a counterexample, the workerA role will be assigned the Read permission to the 
projectC resource by leaderA. 
-- specification AG (!permC[0] -> AG !workerpermC[0]) IN role1.userLeaderA is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
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-> State: 1.1 <- 
  role1.sectApermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[2] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[3] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermB[2] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermB[3] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermC[0] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermC[1] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermC[2] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermC[3] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermD[0] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermD[1] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermD[2] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermD[3] = FALSE 
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  role1.sectBpermA[0] = FALSE 
  role1.sectBpermA[1] = FALSE 
  role1.sectBpermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.sectBpermA[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermA[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[0] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermB[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[0] = TRUE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[3] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[0] = FALSE 
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  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[1] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[2] = FALSE 
  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermD[3] = FALSE 
 The model checker printout reports that the projectD role hierarchy specifications have 
failed in the leaderA module.  More specifically, the specification that failed was the CTL 
statement requiring that a false value in the element zero of permC implying that 
workerpermC[0] must also be false.   The trace shows that the State 1.1 is contrary to this as 
leaderA‟s permC[0] is false, shown by role1.sectApermC[0] = FALSE, while the workerA‟s 
permC[0] is true, shown by  role1.userLeaderA.workerpermC[0] = TRUE.  Either the leaderA‟s 
permission level to projectC resource must be increased or workerA‟s permission level must be 
decreased in order for the model to pass the specification. 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermA[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[0]) | (sectBpermA[0]) | 
(sectCpermA[0]) | (sectDpermA[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[0] & !supervisorPermA[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[0]) | 
(sectBpermA[0]) | (sectCpermA[0]) | (sectDpermA[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[1] & !supervisorPermA[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[1]) | 
(sectBpermA[1]) | (sectCpermA[1]) | (sectDpermA[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[2] & !supervisorPermA[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[2]) | 
(sectBpermA[2]) | (sectCpermA[2]) | (sectDpermA[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[3]) | (sectBpermA[3]) | 
(sectCpermA[3]) | (sectDpermA[3]) ) ) 
 158 
 
 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermB[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[0]) | (sectBpermB[0]) | 
(sectCpermB[0]) | (sectDpermB[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[0] & !supervisorPermB[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[0]) | 
(sectBpermB[0]) | (sectCpermB[0]) | (sectDpermB[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[1] & !supervisorPermB[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[1]) | 
(sectBpermB[1]) | (sectCpermB[1]) | (sectDpermB[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[2] & !supervisorPermB[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[2]) | 
(sectBpermB[2]) | (sectCpermB[2]) | (sectDpermB[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[3]) | (sectBpermB[3]) | 
(sectCpermB[3]) | (sectDpermB[3]) ) ) 
 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermC[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[0]) | (sectBpermC[0]) | 
(sectCpermC[0]) | (sectDpermC[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[0] & !supervisorPermC[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[0]) | 
(sectBpermC[0]) | (sectCpermC[0]) | (sectDpermC[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[1] & !supervisorPermC[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[1]) | 
(sectBpermC[1]) | (sectCpermC[1]) | (sectDpermC[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[2] & !supervisorPermC[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[2]) | 
(sectBpermC[2]) | (sectCpermC[2]) | (sectDpermC[2]) ) ) 
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SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[3]) | (sectBpermC[3]) | 
(sectCpermC[3]) | (sectDpermC[3]) ) ) 
 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermD[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[0]) | (sectBpermD[0]) | 
(sectCpermD[0]) | (sectDpermD[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[0] & !supervisorPermD[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[0]) | 
(sectBpermD[0]) | (sectCpermD[0]) | (sectDpermD[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[1] & !supervisorPermD[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[1]) | 
(sectBpermD[1]) | (sectCpermD[1]) | (sectDpermD[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[2] & !supervisorPermD[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[2]) | 
(sectBpermD[2]) | (sectCpermD[2]) | (sectDpermD[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[3]) | (sectBpermD[3]) | 
(sectCpermD[3]) | (sectDpermD[3]) ) ) 
 The supervisor role‟s role hierarchy specification follows the same layout as that of the 
section leaders except that there are four sets of the five role hierarchy specification.  Each is 
needed to verify that the supervisor role has a higher permission level than all of the section 
leader roles for each project resource.  Examining the last specification, the CTL statement 
requires that the model checker verify that a true value in the supervisor‟s permD[3] implies that 
in “all global states” it should not be possible for section leaderA‟s permD[3], section leaderB‟s 
permD[3], section leaderC‟s permD[3], or section leaderD‟s permD[3] to be true.  The section 
leaders‟ role hierarchy set only had a single worker permD inside of its formula since leader role 
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had one subordinate role that it assigns permissions to.  The supervisor role however has four 
subordinate roles, all of the leader roles, and thus its role hierarchy formula contains all four 
subordinate roles‟ permission arrays.  This will instruct the model checker to compare the 
permission levels of all the supervisor‟s subordinates and verify that all are lower. 
 As a counter example, the supervisor role will only receive the Read permission to 
projectA from the main module. 
-- specification AG ((supervisorPermA[0] & !supervisorPermA[1]) -> AG !(((sectApermA[0] | 
sectBpermA[0]) | sectCpermA[0]) | sectDpermA[0])) IN role1 is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
supervisorPermA[0] = TRUE 
supervisorPermA[1] = FALSE 
supervisorPermA[2] = FALSE 
supervisorPermA[3] = FALSE 
  role1.sectApermA[0] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[1] = TRUE 
  role1.sectApermA[2] = TRUE 
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  role1.sectApermA[3] = FALSE 
The model checker prints that the supervisor‟s role hierarchy involving the permission array to 
projectA resource has failed.  Specifically, the specification requiring that should the 
supervisor‟s highest permission equal Read, supervisorPermA[0] = TRUE, then the permission 
levels of the subordinate roles must be lower.  This is contrary to displayed trace which shows 
that the section leaderA‟s highest permission level, sectApermA[2] = TRUE, is that of 
Document.  In order for the model to pass the specification, either the supervisor‟s permission 
level to projectA resource must be set higher or section leaderA‟s permission level must be 
lowered. 
6.11 Case Study DSOD Specifications 
 The DSOD property requires that users are not assigned roles in which they will have 
access to conflicting sets of permissions.  In the case study, those roles are each section of the 
leader and worker roles to each other.  The reason that each leader, and their subordinate 
workers, is separated from each other leaders and workers is because they must only to be given 
access to one resource.  Thus when assigning users roles, they should only be granted roles that 
involve the same resource.  For example, if a user is assigned the leaderA role then they must not 
be assigned any worker roles that are not for section A or any other leader roles.  The only 
exception of this rule is that of supervisor, whose control of the account grants the user access to 
not only all permissions to all resources, but also all of the roles as well. 
 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[0] -> AG !(givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[5] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
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 Similar to the example model‟s DSOD specification, each specification has the model 
verify that if the user was assigned that role, they should also not be assigned any role that 
conflicts with that role unless they are also assigned the supervisor role.  The specification above 
requires that the model checker verify that in “all global” states, the user being assigned the 
workerA role, from the variable givenRoles[0], implies that in “all global” states one of 
following assignments must be true.  First, the user is not assigned the roles of workerB, from 
variable givenRoles[1], workerC, from variable givenRoles[2], workerD, from variable 
givenRoles[3], leaderB, from variable givenRoles[5], leaderC, from variable givenRoles[6], or 
leaderD, from variable givenRoles[7].  Second, the user is assigned the supervisor role, from 
variable givenRoles[8].  The first case ensures that the user is not assigned any set of conflicting 
roles that will allow them access to different section resources and the second will tell the model 
checker to ignore the first case if the user has been assigned the supervisor role and thus may be 
granted any combination of roles in the account. 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[1] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[2] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[3] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1]| givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[6]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[4] -> AG !(givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[3] | 
givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
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SPEC AG ( givenRoles[5] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[7] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[6] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[3] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[7] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[6]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
 Just like in the example model, there is a specification for each set of conflicting roles 
that exists in the model.  The specifications after the first follow the same template for its CTL 
statement. 
 If the user assigned the workerB role, givenRoles[1], they should not be assigned any 
other worker roles or any leader roles, except leaderB, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 If the user assigned the workerC role, givenRoles[2], they should not be assigned any 
other worker roles or any leader roles, except leaderC, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 If the user assigned the workerD role, givenRoles[3], they should not be assigned any 
other worker roles or any leader roles, except leaderD, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 If the user assigned the leaderA role, givenRoles[4], they should not be assigned any 
other leader roles or any worker role, except workerA, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
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 If the user assigned the leaderB role, givenRoles[5], they should not be assigned any 
other leader roles or any worker role, except workerB, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 If the user assigned the leaderC role, givenRoles[6], they should not be assigned any 
other leader roles or any worker role, except workerC, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 If the user assigned the leaderD role, givenRoles[7], they should not be assigned any 
other leader roles or any worker role, except workerD, unless they have also been 
assigned the supervisor roles. 
 
 As a counter example user Miles will be given the workerC role along with his already 
assigned roles of workerB and leaderB. 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[1] -> (AG !(((((givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2]) | givenRoles[3]) | 
givenRoles[4]) | givenRoles[6]) | givenRoles[7]) | givenRoles[8])) IN userMiles is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
  milesRoles[0] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[1] = TRUE 
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  milesRoles[2] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[3] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[4] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[5] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[6] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[7] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[8] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[9] = FALSE 
-- specification AG (givenRoles[2] -> (AG !(((((givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1]) | givenRoles[3]) | 
givenRoles[4]) | givenRoles[5]) | givenRoles[7]) | givenRoles[8])) IN userMiles is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
  milesRoles[0] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[2] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[3] = FALSE 
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  milesRoles[4] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[5] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[6] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[7] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[8] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[9] = FALSE 
- specification AG (givenRoles[5] -> (AG !(((((givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2]) | givenRoles[7]) | 
givenRoles[4]) | givenRoles[6]) | givenRoles[7]) | givenRoles[8])) IN userMiles is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 3.1 <- 
  milesRoles[0] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[1] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[2] = TRUE 
  milesRoles[3] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[4] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[5] = TRUE 
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  milesRoles[6] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[7] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[8] = FALSE 
  milesRoles[9] = FALSE 
 The model checker reports in the printout that three of the DSOD specifications, 
workerB; workerC; and leaderB; failed within the model.  As mentioned before, the specification 
failures helps with the determining why the user‟s assigned roles did not allow the model to pass.  
According to the traces, Miles was assigned the roles of workerB, as shown in variable 
milesRoles[1], workerC, as shown in variable milesRoles[2], and leader, as shown in variable 
milesRoles[5].  Since workerB and leaderB are not in conflict with each other, then the role 
workerC is the malefactor.  In order for the model to pass the specification, any conflicting roles 
assigned to the user must be addressed. 
SPEC AG (  (  (userSimon.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userMiles.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
 Along with the specifications asking the model checker to verify users‟ have not been 
assigned conflicting pairs of roles, another set of specifications must be included in the main 
module verifying that only one user is allowed to login as the supervisor.  In the case study, the 
supervisor role must be exclusively assigned to only one user.  The above specification has the 
model checker verify that if the user Simon is able to log in as the supervisor, then no other user 
can as well.  The CTL statement translates that in “all global” states, user Simon‟s activeRole 
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equal to supervisor implies that in “all global” states user Miles, Sarah, or Buddy can never log 
in as supervisor as well. 
SPEC AG (  (  (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
Following user Simon‟s supervisor DSOD specification is a similar specification for each user 
that exists in the model.  Just like Simon‟s, their specifications has the model checker verify that 
if a user is able to log in as the supervisor, no one else can. 
 As a counterexample, user Buddy will be assigned the supervisor role while user Simon 
is also still assigned as the supervisor. 
-- specification AG (userSimon.activeRole = supervisor -> AG !((userMiles.activeRole = 
supervisor | userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) | userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor))  is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 1.1 <- 
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  userSimon.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userBuddy.activeRole = loggedOut 
-> Input: 1.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userSimon 
  running = FALSE 
  userBuddy.running = FALSE 
  userSimon.running = TRUE 
-> State: 1.2 <- 
  userSimon.activeRole = supervisor 
-> Input: 1.3 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userBuddy 
  userBuddy.running = TRUE 
  userSimon.running = FALSE 
-> State: 1.3 <- 
  userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor 
-- specification AG (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor -> AG !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor | userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) | userSarah.activeRole = supervisor))  is false 
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence 
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Trace Description: CTL Counterexample  
Trace Type: Counterexample  
-> State: 2.1 <- 
  userSimon.activeRole = loggedOut 
  userBuddy.activeRole = loggedOut 
-> Input: 2.2 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userBuddy 
  running = FALSE 
  userBuddy.running = TRUE 
  userSimon.running = FALSE 
-> State: 2.2 <- 
  userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor 
-> Input: 2.3 <- 
  _process_selector_ = userSimon 
  userBuddy.running = FALSE 
  userSimon.running = TRUE 
-> State: 2.3 <- 
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  userSimon.activeRole = supervisor 
The model checker printout reports that users Simon and Buddy both failed the DSOD 
specification requiring that only one user be allowed to login as the supervisor.  The first trace 
shows that from state 1.1 to state 1.3, user Simon‟s activeRole is equal to supervisor followed by 
user Buddy.  The second trace reveals in state 2.1 to 2.3 that user Buddy‟s activeRole becomes 
supervisor followed by user Simon.  In order for the model checker to pass the supervisor 
DSOD, only one user can ever be allowed to login as the supervisor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this thesis, formal modeling and model checking are used to verify the security 
properties of social networks.  These systems have become a major facilitator of communication 
for people around the world.  A person, from any location, can interact with others in as personal 
a manner as they desire.  Whether with an old acquaintance, or attempting to make a new one, 
social networks allow users to associate with people of any interest, taste, past or background. 
To allow users to express themselves to the fullest, many social networks allow their 
clients to upload various contents onto their accounts.  Any form of digital media, which is 
usually pictures, videos, and text documents, can be displayed by users to share with others 
inside of the network.  Though all of the data is meant to be shared, not all users may wish for 
the general public to be able to access their account‟s stored contents.  In order to support this 
desire, many social networks allow their users to not only dictate who can access their account 
resources, but also regulate the types of actions that the other users can perform upon those 
resources. 
However, being that resource materials may consist of items of a sensitive nature, 
unauthorized access must be prevented at all costs.  Thus social networks have implemented 
various security measures in order to ensure their users‟ resources are protected.  The security 
measure covered in this paper is that of RBAC.  This security policy requires that all users must 
receive a pre-defined role when operating inside of the system.  This role is assigned a set of 
permissions that will influence what actions a user can perform upon system objects.  Whenever 
a user attempts to interact with any object, their granted permissions are always analyzed to 
determine what commands they can execute.  A social network‟s RBAC implementation allows 
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for the creation of contact lists inside of the accounts that determines the assigning of roles to 
other users.  Whenever anyone accesses any of the account materials, their name is compared to 
the entries of the contact list and returns a role prescribed for that user.  The administrators of a 
social network account determine which permissions each of these roles should have.  
Depending upon which privileges were granted determines whether or not a user can write a 
comment, view the contents of the account, or even know that these objects even exist. 
 This thesis demonstrates how formal modeling and analysis of these security properties 
can assist in evaluating the effectiveness of the protection offered.  Once a model of the social 
network and its RBAC protocols is created in the NuSMV input language, the NuSMV model 
checker can determine whether or not the RBAC properties hold within the model.  This is 
accomplished by having each RBAC property translated into temporal logic specifications inside 
of the model.  The model checker then explores every possible state of the social network model 
to determine if it is possible for the model to reach a state that violates any of the RBAC 
specifications.  Should any breaches of the needed security protocol exists, the model will then 
output a trace showing which model components and specifications are the source of the conflict. 
 The case study provided involves a model of a private social network with multiple 
degrees of administrating both the project resources and the permissions to them.  Which 
permissions are dictated to each role is based upon a superior role‟s prerogatives and the 
minimum duties that must be accomplished by each role.  Though more than one project 
resource exists in the social network, each role is usually only allowed to be able to have access 
to one project resource and no other.  The only exception to this case is the user with the 
supervisor role that created the account and thus should have all root permissions to every 
project that is uploaded. 
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  The counter examples, in which each RBAC policy is circumvented, show that the 
model checker‟s CTL specifications can determine whether or not the desired access control 
protocols of the account were upheld.  In each example, the model checker reports which 
specification failed and then prints a history trace showing how the model reached such an 
unacceptable state.  The shown specification tells us which access control policy the user was 
able to ignore, and the trace tells the values and states of the modules that allowed the failure.  
When examined together, weaknesses that allowed the user unauthorized access can be quickly 
found.  This can be seen in the first counter example, where users are allowed to execute 
commands while not having the permissions to do so.  After the model checker examined the 
flawed model, the RBAC specifications reported that the model failed to uphold the necessary 
RBAC properties.  The model checker then outputs traces to show how the user was able to 
bypass their given privileges.  These pieces of evidence would lead one to the defective user 
module that allowed users to execute commands while not analyzing their permissions.   During 
the development of a complex system, such as a social network, these counter examples can 
assist in creating test cases for the implementation.  The inclusion of formal modeling and model 
checking can aid in fashioning an effective security policy that can be counted on to prevent 
unwarranted access. 
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APPENDIX A: Example Model Coding 
MODULE main 
VAR 
   movie : videoResource(); 
   movieReview : textFileResource(); 
 
   editorPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   editorPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
 
   writerPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   writerPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
 
  role1 : editorRole(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB); 
  role2 : writerRole(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB); 
 
   semEditor : semaphore(); 
   semWriter : semaphore(); 
 
   jamesRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   brianRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   jacobRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   willyRoles : array 0..2 of boolean; 
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   name1 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name2 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name3 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
   name4 : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
 
   userJames : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, jamesRoles, name1); 
   userBrian : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, brianRoles, name2); 
   userJacob : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, jacobRoles, name3); 
   userWilly : process userSessions( semEditor, semWriter, willyRoles, name4); 
 
ASSIGN 
 
  editorPermA[0] := TRUE; 
  editorPermA[1] := TRUE; 
  editorPermA[2] := TRUE; 
 
  editorPermB[0] := FALSE; 
  editorPermB[1] := FALSE; 
 
  writerPermA[0] := FALSE; 
  writerPermA[1] := FALSE; 
  writerPermA[2] := FALSE; 
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  writerPermB[0] := TRUE; 
  writerPermB[1] := TRUE; 
 
  jamesRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  jamesRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  jamesRoles[2] := FALSE; 
 
  brianRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  brianRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  brianRoles[2] := TRUE; 
 
  jacobRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  jacobRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  jacobRoles[2] := FALSE; 
 
  willyRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  willyRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  willyRoles[2] := FALSE; 
 
  name1 := James; 
  name2 := Brian; 
  name3 := Jacob; 
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  name4 := Willy; 
 
 
--  DSOD Specification 
SPEC AG (  (  (userJames.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userBrian.activeRole = editor) | 
(userJacob.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userBrian.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userJacob.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userJacob.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userBrian.activeRole = editor) | (userWilly.activeRole = editor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userWilly.activeRole = editor) -> AG  !((userJames.activeRole = editor) | 
(userBrian.activeRole = editor) | (userJacob.activeRole = editor) ))) 
 
MODULE writerRole(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB) 
VAR 
   userWriter : process User(movie, movieReview, writerPermA, writerPermB); 
 
-- Minimum Duties Specification 
SPEC AG( (!writerPermA[0] & !writerPermA[1] & !writerPermA[2] ) & (writerPermB[1]) ) 
 
-- SSOD Specification 
SPEC AG( (writerPermA[0] -> AG !writerPermB[0]) & (writerPermB[0] ->  AG 
!writerPermB[0]) ) 
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MODULE editorRole(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB) 
VAR 
 
   userEditor : process User(movie, movieReview, editorPermA, editorPermB); 
 
 
   internPermA : array 0..2 of boolean; 
   internPermB : array 0..1 of boolean; 
 
 
   role3 : internRole(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB); 
ASSIGN 
 
  internPermA[0] := TRUE; 
  internPermA[1] := FALSE; 
  internPermA[2] := FALSE; 
 
  internPermB[0] := FALSE; 
  internPermB[1] := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties Specification 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[2]) & (!editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1]) ) 
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--Role Hierarchy Specification 
SPEC AG( (!editorPermA[0]) -> AG !(internPermA[0])) 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[0] & !editorPermA[1]) -> AG !(internPermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[1] & !editorPermA[2]) -> AG !(internPermA[1])  ) 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[2]) -> AG !(internPermA[2])) 
 
--Role Hierarchy Specification 
SPEC AG( (!editorPermB[0]) -> AG !(internPermB[0])) 
SPEC AG( (editorPermB[0] & !editorPermB[1]) -> AG !(internPermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (editorPermB[1]) -> AG !(internPermB[1])) 
 
-- SSOD Specification 
SPEC AG( (editorPermA[0] -> AG !editorPermB[0]) & (editorPermB[0] ->  AG 
!editorPermB[0]) ) 
 
MODULE internRole(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB) 
VAR 
   userIntern : process User(movie, movieReview, internPermA, internPermB); 
 
-- Minimum Duties Specification  
SPEC AG( (internPermA[0] & !internPermA[1] & !internPermA[2]) & (!internPermB[0] & 
!internPermB[1])) 
 
-- SSOD Specification  
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SPEC AG( (internPermA[0] -> AG !internPermB[0]) | (internPermB[0] ->  AG 
!internPermA[0]) ) 
 
 
MODULE videoResource() 
VAR 
   state : {Wait, Play, Copy, Delete}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(state) := Wait; 
 
MODULE textFileResource() 
VAR 
  state : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(state) := Wait; 
 
MODULE User(movie, movieReview, permA, permB) 
VAR 
 
  myCommandA : {Wait, Play, Copy, Delete}; 
  myCommandB : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
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ASSIGN 
  init(myCommandA) := Wait; 
  init(myCommandB) := Wait; 
 
  next(myCommandA) :=    case 
     (permA[0] & !permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Play}; 
     (!permA[0] & permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Copy}; 
     (permA[0] & permA[1] & !permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Copy}; 
     (!permA[0] & !permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Delete}; 
     (permA[0] & !permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Delete}; 
     (!permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Copy, Delete}; 
     (permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) : {Wait, Play, Copy, Delete}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(movie.state) :=  case 
   myCommandA != Wait : myCommandA; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
 
  next(myCommandB) := case 
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     (permB[0] & !permB[1]) : {Wait, Read}; 
     --(!permB[0] & permB[1]) : {Wait, Write}; 
     (permB[0] & permB[1]) : {Wait, Read, Write}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(movieReview.state) := case 
   myCommandB != Wait : myCommandB; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
-- Access Control Specification 
SPEC AG ! (permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Play) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Copy) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Delete) 
 
SPEC AG ! (permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) 
 
-- Permission Hierarchy Specification 
SPEC AG (  (permA[1]) -> (permA[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permA[2]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permB[1]) -> (permB[0]) )                                                                     
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MODULE userSessions(semEditor, semWriter, givenRoles, myName) 
VAR 
   activeRole : {loggedOut, intern, editor, writer}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(activeRole) := {loggedOut}; 
 
   next(activeRole) := case 
   (givenRoles[2] & !semWriter.sema) : {writer}; 
   (givenRoles[1] & !semEditor.sema) : {editor}; 
   (givenRoles[0]) : {intern}; 
   TRUE : loggedOut; 
   esac; 
 
 
   next(semEditor.sema) := case 
     activeRole = editor : TRUE; 
     activeRole != editor & semEditor.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semEditor.userName) := case 
     activeRole = editor : myName; 
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     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semWriter.sema) := case 
     activeRole = writer : TRUE; 
     activeRole != writer & semEditor.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semWriter.userName) := case 
     activeRole = writer : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 
 
-- DSOD Specification 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[1] -> AG !(givenRoles[2])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[2] -> AG !(givenRoles[1])  ) 
 
 
MODULE semaphore() 
VAR 
   sema : boolean; 
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   userName : { None, James, Brian, Jacob, Willy}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(sema) := FALSE; 
   init(userName) := None; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B:  Case Study SMV Coding 
 
MODULE main 
VAR 
  projectA :  Resource(); 
  projectB :  Resource(); 
  projectC :  Resource(); 
  projectD :  Resource(); 
 
  supervisorPermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  supervisorPermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  supervisorPermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  supervisorPermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
 
  role1 : Supervisor(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, supervisorPermB, 
supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD); 
 
   semLA : semaphore(); 
   semLB : semaphore(); 
   semLC : semaphore(); 
   semLD : semaphore(); 
   semS : semaphore(); 
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   simonRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   milesRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   sarahRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
   buddyRoles : array 0..8 of boolean; 
 
   name1 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name2 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name3 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
   name4 : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
 
   userSimon : process userSession( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, simonRoles, 
name1); 
   userMiles : process userSession( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, milesRoles, name2); 
   userSarah : process userSession( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, sarahRoles, name3); 
   userBuddy : process userSession( semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, buddyRoles, 
name4); 
 
ASSIGN 
  supervisorPermA[0] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermA[1] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermA[2] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermA[3] := TRUE; 
 
  supervisorPermB[0] := TRUE; 
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  supervisorPermB[1] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermB[2] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermB[3] := TRUE; 
 
  supervisorPermC[0] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermC[1] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermC[2] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermC[3] := TRUE; 
 
  supervisorPermD[0] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermD[1] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermD[2] := TRUE; 
  supervisorPermD[3] := TRUE; 
 
  name1 := Simon; 
  name2 := Miles; 
  name3 := Sarah; 
  name4 := Buddy; 
 
  simonRoles[0] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[2] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[3] := TRUE; 
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  simonRoles[4] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[5] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[6] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[7] := TRUE; 
  simonRoles[8] := TRUE; 
 
  milesRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[1] := TRUE; 
  milesRoles[2] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[3] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[5] := TRUE; 
  milesRoles[6] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[7] := FALSE; 
  milesRoles[8] := FALSE; 
 
  sarahRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[2] := TRUE; 
  sarahRoles[3] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[5] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[6] := TRUE; 
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  sarahRoles[7] := FALSE; 
  sarahRoles[8] := FALSE; 
 
  buddyRoles[0] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[1] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[2] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[3] := TRUE; 
  buddyRoles[4] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[5] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[6] := FALSE; 
  buddyRoles[7] := TRUE; 
  buddyRoles[8] := FALSE; 
 
-- DSOD specification  
SPEC AG (  (  (userSimon.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userMiles.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) | (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
SPEC AG (  (  (userBuddy.activeRole = supervisor) -> AG  !((userSimon.activeRole = 
supervisor) | (userMiles.activeRole = supervisor) | (userSarah.activeRole = supervisor) ))) 
 
 
MODULE semaphore() 
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VAR 
   -- If sema is False, a user is not using the exclusive role and may login with the role.  If sema is 
True, a user is using the exclusive role and may not login with the role. 
   sema : boolean; 
 
   -- Variable used to store the name of the user that activated the semaphore. 
   userName : { None, Simon, Miles, Sarah, Buddy}; 
ASSIGN 
   init(sema) := FALSE; 
   init(userName) := None; 
 
MODULE Resource() 
VAR 
   state :  {Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
 
ASSIGN 
  init(state) := {Wait}; 
 
MODULE Supervisor(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, 
supervisorPermB,supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD) 
VAR 
  sectApermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectApermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectApermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
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  sectApermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
 
  sectBpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectBpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectBpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectBpermD : array 0..3 of boolean;    
 
  sectCpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectCpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectCpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectCpermD : array 0..3 of boolean;  
 
  sectDpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectDpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectDpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  sectDpermD : array 0..3 of boolean;  
 
  userSupervisor : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, supervisorPermA, 
supervisorPermB, supervisorPermC, supervisorPermD); 
 
  userLeaderA : sectionLeaderA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, 
sectApermB, sectApermC, sectApermD); 
  userLeaderB : sectionLeaderB(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectBpermA, 
sectBpermB, sectBpermC, sectBpermD); 
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  userLeaderC : sectionLeaderC(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectCpermA, 
sectCpermB, sectCpermC, sectCpermD); 
  userLeaderD : sectionLeaderD(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectDpermA, 
sectDpermB, sectDpermC, sectDpermD); 
 
ASSIGN 
 
  sectApermA[0] := TRUE; 
  sectApermA[1] := TRUE; 
  sectApermA[2] := TRUE; 
  sectApermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectApermB[0] := FALSE; 
  sectApermB[1] := FALSE; 
  sectApermB[2] := FALSE; 
  sectApermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectApermC[0] := FALSE; 
  sectApermC[1] := FALSE; 
  sectApermC[2] := FALSE; 
  sectApermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectApermD[0] := FALSE; 
  sectApermD[1] := FALSE; 
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  sectApermD[2] := FALSE; 
  sectApermD[3] := FALSE; 
-- 
  sectBpermA[0] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermA[1] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermA[2] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectBpermB[0] := TRUE; 
  sectBpermB[1] := TRUE; 
  sectBpermB[2] := TRUE; 
  sectBpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectBpermC[0] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermC[1] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermC[2] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectBpermD[0] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermD[1] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermD[2] := FALSE; 
  sectBpermD[3] := FALSE; 
-- 
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  sectCpermA[0] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermA[1] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermA[2] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectCpermB[0] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermB[1] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermB[2] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectCpermC[0] := TRUE; 
  sectCpermC[1] := TRUE; 
  sectCpermC[2] := TRUE; 
  sectCpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectCpermD[0] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermD[1] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermD[2] := FALSE; 
  sectCpermD[3] := FALSE; 
-- 
  sectDpermA[0] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermA[1] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermA[2] := FALSE; 
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  sectDpermA[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectDpermB[0] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermB[1] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermB[2] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermB[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectDpermC[0] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermC[1] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermC[2] := FALSE; 
  sectDpermC[3] := FALSE; 
 
  sectDpermD[0] := TRUE; 
  sectDpermD[1] := TRUE; 
  sectDpermD[2] := TRUE; 
  sectDpermD[3] := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[3]) & (supervisorPermB[3]) & (supervisorPermC[3]) & 
(supervisorPermD[3])) 
 
--Role Hierarchy 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermA[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[0]) | (sectBpermA[0]) | 
(sectCpermA[0]) | (sectDpermA[0]) ) ) 
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SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[0] & !supervisorPermA[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[0]) | 
(sectBpermA[0]) | (sectCpermA[0]) | (sectDpermA[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[1] & !supervisorPermA[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[1]) | 
(sectBpermA[1]) | (sectCpermA[1]) | (sectDpermA[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[2] & !supervisorPermA[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[2]) | 
(sectBpermA[2]) | (sectCpermA[2]) | (sectDpermA[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermA[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermA[3]) | (sectBpermA[3]) | 
(sectCpermA[3]) | (sectDpermA[3]) ) ) 
 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermB[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[0]) | (sectBpermB[0]) | 
(sectCpermB[0]) | (sectDpermB[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[0] & !supervisorPermB[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[0]) | 
(sectBpermB[0]) | (sectCpermB[0]) | (sectDpermB[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[1] & !supervisorPermB[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[1]) | 
(sectBpermB[1]) | (sectCpermB[1]) | (sectDpermB[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[2] & !supervisorPermB[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[2]) | 
(sectBpermB[2]) | (sectCpermB[2]) | (sectDpermB[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermB[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermB[3]) | (sectBpermB[3]) | 
(sectCpermB[3]) | (sectDpermB[3]) ) ) 
 
SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermC[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[0]) | (sectBpermC[0]) | 
(sectCpermC[0]) | (sectDpermC[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[0] & !supervisorPermC[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[0]) | 
(sectBpermC[0]) | (sectCpermC[0]) | (sectDpermC[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[1] & !supervisorPermC[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[1]) | 
(sectBpermC[1]) | (sectCpermC[1]) | (sectDpermC[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[2] & !supervisorPermC[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[2]) | 
(sectBpermC[2]) | (sectCpermC[2]) | (sectDpermC[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermC[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermC[3]) | (sectBpermC[3]) | 
(sectCpermC[3]) | (sectDpermC[3]) ) ) 
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SPEC AG( (!supervisorPermD[0]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[0]) | (sectBpermD[0]) | 
(sectCpermD[0]) | (sectDpermD[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[0] & !supervisorPermD[1]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[0]) | 
(sectBpermD[0]) | (sectCpermD[0]) | (sectDpermD[0]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[1] & !supervisorPermD[2]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[1]) | 
(sectBpermD[1]) | (sectCpermD[1]) | (sectDpermD[1]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[2] & !supervisorPermD[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[2]) | 
(sectBpermD[2]) | (sectCpermD[2]) | (sectDpermD[2]) ) ) 
SPEC AG( (supervisorPermD[3]) -> AG !( (sectApermD[3]) | (sectBpermD[3]) | 
(sectCpermD[3]) | (sectDpermD[3]) ) ) 
 
-- Double SSOD 2 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermA[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    &    
((sectCpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectBpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[2]))    &    
((sectDpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectBpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[2]))  ) 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermB[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    &    
((sectCpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[2]))    &    
((sectDpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectCpermB[2]))  ) 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermC[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    &    
((sectCpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[2]))    &    
((sectDpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermC[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[2]))  ) 
SPEC AG( ((sectApermD[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    
&    ((sectBpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    &    
((sectCpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[2]))    &    
((sectDpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermD[2] & !sectBpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[2]))  ) 
 
-- END OF SUPERVISOR 
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MODULE sectionLeaderA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, 
sectApermB,sectApermC, sectApermD) 
VAR 
  workerpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  userLeaderA : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectApermA, sectApermB, 
sectApermC, sectApermD); 
  workerForA : workerA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, workerpermB, 
workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
ASSIGN 
 
   workerpermA[0]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermA[1]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermA[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermB[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[2]    := FALSE; 
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   workerpermB[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermC[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermD[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[3]    := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[2] & !sectApermA[3]) | (sectApermB[2] &!sectApermB[3]) | 
(sectApermC[2] & !sectApermC[3]) | (sectApermD[2] & !sectApermD[3])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (sectApermA[2]) -> AG (!sectApermB[2] & !sectApermC[2] & !sectApermD[2])) 
& ((sectApermB[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermC[2] & !sectApermD[2])) & 
((sectApermC[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2] & !sectApermD[2])) & 
((sectApermD[2]) -> AG (!sectApermA[2] & !sectApermB[2] & !sectApermC[2]) )) 
 
--Role Hierarchy 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermA[0]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[0] & !sectApermA[1]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
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SPEC AG( (sectApermA[1] & !sectApermA[2]) -> AG !(workerpermA[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[2] & !sectApermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermB[0]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[0] & !sectApermB[1]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[1] & !sectApermB[2]) -> AG !(workerpermB[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[2] & !sectApermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermC[0]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[0] & !sectApermC[1]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[1] & !sectApermC[2]) -> AG !(workerpermC[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[2] & !sectApermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectApermD[0]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[0] & !sectApermD[1]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[1] & !sectApermD[2]) -> AG !(workerpermD[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[2] & !sectApermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectApermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[3])) 
 
----------------- End of sectionLeader A 
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MODULE sectionLeaderB(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectBpermA, 
sectBpermB,sectBpermC, sectBpermD) 
VAR 
  workerpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  userLeaderB : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectBpermA, sectBpermB, 
sectBpermC, sectBpermD); 
  workerForB : workerB(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, workerpermB, 
workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
ASSIGN 
   workerpermA[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermB[0]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermB[1]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermB[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[3]    := FALSE; 
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   workerpermC[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermD[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[3]    := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermA[2] & !sectBpermA[3]) | (sectBpermB[2] &!sectBpermB[3]) | 
(sectBpermC[2] & !sectBpermC[3]) | (sectBpermD[2] & !sectBpermD[3])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (sectBpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermB[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectBpermD[2])) & 
((sectBpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermA[2] & !sectBpermC[2] & !sectBpermD[2])) & 
((sectBpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermA[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectBpermD[2])) & 
((sectBpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectBpermA[2] & !sectBpermB[2] & !sectBpermC[2]) )) 
 
--Role Hierarchy 
SPEC AG( !(sectBpermA[0]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermA[0] & !sectBpermA[1]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermA[1] & !sectBpermA[2]) -> AG !(workerpermA[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermA[2] & !sectBpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[2]) ) 
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SPEC AG( (sectBpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectBpermB[0]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermB[0] & !sectBpermB[1]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermB[1] & !sectBpermB[2]) -> AG !(workerpermB[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermB[2] & !sectBpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectBpermC[0]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermC[0] & !sectBpermC[1]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermC[1] & !sectBpermC[2]) -> AG !(workerpermC[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermC[2] & !sectBpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectBpermD[0]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermD[0] & !sectBpermD[1]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermD[1] & !sectBpermD[2]) -> AG !(workerpermD[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermD[2] & !sectBpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectBpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[3])) 
 
----------------- End of sectionLeader B 
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MODULE sectionLeaderC(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectCpermA, 
sectCpermB,sectCpermC, sectCpermD) 
VAR 
  workerpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  userLeaderC : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectCpermA, sectCpermB, 
sectCpermC, sectCpermD); 
  workerForC : workerC(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, workerpermB, 
workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
ASSIGN 
   workerpermA[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermB[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermC[0]    := TRUE; 
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   workerpermC[1]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermC[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermD[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[3]    := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[3]) | (sectCpermB[2] &!sectCpermB[3]) | 
(sectCpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[3]) | (sectCpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[3])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (sectCpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectCpermB[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectCpermD[2])) & 
((sectCpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectCpermA[2] & !sectCpermC[2] & !sectCpermD[2])) & 
((sectCpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectCpermA[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectCpermD[2])) & 
((sectCpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectCpermA[2] & !sectCpermB[2] & !sectCpermC[2]) )) 
 
--Role Hierarchy 
SPEC AG( !(sectCpermA[0]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermA[0] & !sectCpermA[1]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermA[1] & !sectCpermA[2]) -> AG !(workerpermA[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermA[2] & !sectCpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[3])) 
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SPEC AG( !(sectCpermB[0]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermB[0] & !sectCpermB[1]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermB[1] & !sectCpermB[2]) -> AG !(workerpermB[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermB[2] & !sectCpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectCpermC[0]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermC[0] & !sectCpermC[1]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermC[1] & !sectCpermC[2]) -> AG !(workerpermC[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermC[2] & !sectCpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectCpermD[0]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermD[0] & !sectCpermD[1]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermD[1] & !sectCpermD[2]) -> AG !(workerpermD[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermD[2] & !sectCpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectCpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[3])) 
 
----------------- End of sectionLeader C 
 
MODULE sectionLeaderD(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectDpermA, 
sectDpermB,sectDpermC, sectDpermD) 
 212 
 
VAR 
  workerpermA : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermB : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermC : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  workerpermD : array 0..3 of boolean; 
  userLeaderD : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, sectDpermA, sectDpermB, 
sectDpermC, sectDpermD); 
  workerForD : workerD(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, workerpermB, 
workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
ASSIGN 
   workerpermA[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermA[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermB[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermB[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermC[0]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[1]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermC[2]    := FALSE; 
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   workerpermC[3]    := FALSE; 
 
   workerpermD[0]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermD[1]    := TRUE; 
   workerpermD[2]    := FALSE; 
   workerpermD[3]    := FALSE; 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[3]) | (sectDpermB[2] &!sectDpermB[3]) | 
(sectDpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[3]) | (sectDpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[3])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (sectDpermA[2]) -> AG (!sectDpermB[2] & !sectDpermC[2] & !sectDpermD[2])) 
& ((sectDpermB[2]) -> AG (!sectDpermA[2] & !sectDpermC[2] & !sectDpermD[2])) & 
((sectDpermC[2]) -> AG (!sectDpermA[2] & !sectDpermB[2] & !sectDpermD[2])) & 
((sectDpermD[2]) -> AG (!sectDpermA[2] & !sectDpermB[2] & !sectDpermC[2]) )) 
 
--Role Hierarchy 
SPEC AG( !(sectDpermA[0]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermA[0] & !sectDpermA[1]) -> AG !(workerpermA[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermA[1] & !sectDpermA[2]) -> AG !(workerpermA[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermA[2] & !sectDpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermA[3]) -> AG !(workerpermA[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectDpermB[0]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
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SPEC AG( (sectDpermB[0] & !sectDpermB[1]) -> AG !(workerpermB[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermB[1] & !sectDpermB[2]) -> AG !(workerpermB[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermB[2] & !sectDpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermB[3]) -> AG !(workerpermB[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectDpermC[0]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermC[0] & !sectDpermC[1]) -> AG !(workerpermC[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermC[1] & !sectDpermC[2]) -> AG !(workerpermC[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermC[2] & !sectDpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermC[3]) -> AG !(workerpermC[3])) 
 
SPEC AG( !(sectDpermD[0]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermD[0] & !sectDpermD[1]) -> AG !(workerpermD[0]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermD[1] & !sectDpermD[2]) -> AG !(workerpermD[1]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermD[2] & !sectDpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[2]) ) 
SPEC AG( (sectDpermD[3]) -> AG !(workerpermD[3])) 
 
----------------- End of sectionLeader D 
 
MODULE workerA(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB,workerpermC, workerpermD) 
VAR 
   userWorkerA : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB, workerpermC, workerpermD); 
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-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] &!workerpermB[2]) | 
(workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2]) | (workerpermD[1] & !workerpermD[2])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (workerpermA[1]) -> AG (!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermB[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermC[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermD[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermC[1]) )) 
 
MODULE workerB(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB,workerpermC, workerpermD) 
VAR 
   userWorkerB : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB, workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] &!workerpermB[2]) | 
(workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2]) | (workerpermD[1] & !workerpermD[2])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (workerpermA[1]) -> AG (!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermB[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermC[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermD[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermC[1]) )) 
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MODULE workerC(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB,workerpermC, workerpermD) 
VAR 
   userWorkerC : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB, workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] &!workerpermB[2]) | 
(workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2]) | (workerpermD[1] & !workerpermD[2])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
SPEC AG(( (workerpermA[1]) -> AG (!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermB[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermC[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermD[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermC[1]) )) 
 
MODULE workerD(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB,workerpermC, workerpermD) 
VAR 
   userWorker : process User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, workerpermA, 
workerpermB, workerpermC, workerpermD); 
 
-- Minimum Duties 
SPEC AG( (workerpermA[1] & !workerpermA[2]) | (workerpermB[1] &!workerpermB[2]) | 
(workerpermC[1] & !workerpermC[2]) | (workerpermD[1] & !workerpermD[2])) 
 
-- Static Separation of Duties 
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SPEC AG(( (workerpermA[1]) -> AG (!workerpermB[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermB[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermC[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermC[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermD[1])) & ((workerpermD[1]) -> AG (!workerpermA[1] & !workerpermB[1] & 
!workerpermC[1]) )) 
 
MODULE User(projectA, projectB, projectC, projectD, permA, permB, permC, permD) 
VAR 
 
  myCommandA : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
  myCommandB : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
  myCommandC : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
  myCommandD : { Wait, Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
 
ASSIGN 
 
  init(myCommandA) := Wait; 
  init(myCommandB) := Wait; 
  init(myCommandC) := Wait; 
  init(myCommandD) := Wait; 
 
  next(myCommandA) := case 
 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = FALSE) & (permA[2] = FALSE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read}; 
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                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = FALSE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE)  : {Wait,Read, Write}; 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = TRUE) & 
(permA[3] = FALSE)  : {Wait,Read, Write,Document}; 
                          (permA[0] = TRUE) & (permA[1] = TRUE) & (permA[2] = TRUE) & 
(permA[3] = TRUE) : {Wait,Read, Write,Document, Schedule}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(projectA.state) :=  
   case 
   myCommandA != Wait : myCommandA; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
 
 
  next(myCommandB) := case 
 
                          (permB[0] = TRUE) & (permB[1] = FALSE) & (permB[2] = FALSE) & 
(permB[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read}; 
                          (permB[0] = TRUE) & (permB[1] = TRUE) & (permB[2] = FALSE) & 
(permB[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write}; 
                          (permB[0] = TRUE) & (permB[1] = TRUE) & (permB[2] = TRUE) & 
(permB[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document}; 
                          (permB[0] = TRUE) & (permB[1] = TRUE) & (permB[2] = TRUE) & 
(permB[3] = TRUE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
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     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(projectB.state) :=  
   case 
   myCommandB != Wait : myCommandB; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
 
 
 
  next(myCommandC) := case 
 
                          (permC[0] = TRUE) & (permC[1] = FALSE) & (permC[2] = FALSE) & 
(permC[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read}; 
                          (permC[0] = TRUE) & (permC[1] = TRUE) & (permC[2] = FALSE) & 
(permC[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write}; 
                          (permC[0] = TRUE) & (permC[1] = TRUE) & (permC[2] = TRUE) & 
(permC[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document}; 
                          (permC[0] = TRUE) & (permC[1] = TRUE) & (permC[2] = TRUE) & 
(permC[3] = TRUE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(projectC.state) :=  
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   case 
   myCommandC != Wait : myCommandC; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
 
  next(myCommandD) := case 
 
                          (permD[0] = TRUE) & (permD[1] = FALSE) & (permD[2] = FALSE) & 
(permD[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read}; 
                          (permD[0] = TRUE) & (permD[1] = TRUE) & (permD[2] = FALSE) & 
(permD[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write}; 
                          (permD[0] = TRUE) & (permD[1] = TRUE) & (permD[2] = TRUE) & 
(permD[3] = FALSE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document}; 
                          (permD[0] = TRUE) & (permD[1] = TRUE) & (permD[2] = TRUE) & 
(permD[3] = TRUE) : {Wait,Read, Write, Document, Schedule}; 
     TRUE   :  Wait; 
     esac; 
 
  next(projectD.state) :=  
   case 
   myCommandD != Wait : myCommandD; 
   TRUE   : Wait; 
   esac; 
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-- Standard Access Control Checks.  If you don't have the permission, you can't do the command. 
SPEC AG ! (permA[0] = FALSE & myCommandA = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[1] = FALSE & myCommandA = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[2] = FALSE & myCommandA = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permA[3] = FALSE & myCommandA = Schedule) 
 
 
SPEC AG ! (permB[0] = FALSE & myCommandB = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[1] = FALSE & myCommandB = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[2] = FALSE & myCommandB = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permB[3] = FALSE & myCommandB = Schedule) 
 
 
SPEC AG ! (permC[0] = FALSE & myCommandC = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[1] = FALSE & myCommandC = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[2] = FALSE & myCommandC = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permC[3] = FALSE & myCommandC = Schedule) 
 
 
SPEC AG ! (permD[0] = FALSE & myCommandD = Read) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[1] = FALSE & myCommandD = Write) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[2] = FALSE & myCommandD = Document) 
SPEC AG ! (permD[3] = FALSE & myCommandD = Schedule) 
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-- Sets hierachy of the permissions.  If you have a higher permission, you should have the lower 
too. 
SPEC AG (  (permA[1]) -> (permA[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permA[2]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permA[3]) -> (permA[0] & permA[1] & permA[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permB[1]) -> (permB[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permB[2]) -> (permB[0] & permB[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permB[3]) -> (permB[0] & permB[1] & permB[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permC[1]) -> (permC[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permC[2]) -> (permC[0] & permC[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permC[3]) -> (permC[0] & permC[1] & permC[2]) )                           
 
SPEC AG (  (permD[1]) -> (permD[0]) )                                                                     
SPEC AG (  (permD[2]) -> (permD[0] & permD[1]) )                                               
SPEC AG (  (permD[3]) -> (permD[0] & permD[1] & permD[2]) )                           
 
MODULE userSession(semLA, semLB, semLC, semLD, semS, givenRoles, myName) 
VAR 
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   activeRole : {loggedOut, workerA, workerB, workerC, workerD, leaderA, leaderB, leaderC, 
leaderD, supervisor}; 
 
ASSIGN 
 
   init(activeRole) := {loggedOut}; 
 
   next(activeRole) := case 
   (givenRoles[8] & !semS.sema) : {supervisor}; 
   (givenRoles[7] & !semLD.sema) : {leaderD}; 
   (givenRoles[6] & !semLC.sema) : {leaderC}; 
   (givenRoles[5] & !semLB.sema) : {leaderB}; 
   (givenRoles[4] & !semLA.sema) : {leaderA}; 
   (givenRoles[3]) : {workerD}; 
   (givenRoles[2]) : {workerC}; 
   (givenRoles[1]) : {workerB}; 
   (givenRoles[0]) : {workerA}; 
   TRUE : loggedOut; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semS.sema) := case 
     activeRole = supervisor : TRUE; 
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     activeRole != supervisor & semS.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
 
   next(semS.userName) := case 
     activeRole = supervisor : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semLD.sema) := case 
     activeRole = leaderD : TRUE; 
     activeRole != leaderD & semLD.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
 
   next(semLD.userName) := case 
     activeRole = leaderD : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
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   next(semLC.sema) := case 
     activeRole = leaderC : TRUE; 
     activeRole != leaderC & semLC.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
 
   next(semLC.userName) := case 
     activeRole = leaderC : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semLB.sema) := case 
     activeRole = leaderB : TRUE; 
     activeRole != leaderB & semLB.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semLB.userName) := case 
     activeRole = leaderB : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
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   next(semLA.sema) := case 
     activeRole = leaderA : TRUE; 
     activeRole != leaderA & semLA.userName = myName : FALSE; 
     TRUE : FALSE; 
   esac; 
 
   next(semLA.userName) := case 
     activeRole = leaderA : myName; 
     TRUE : None; 
   esac; 
-- DSOD for Worker Roles 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[0] -> AG !(givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[5] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[1] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[2] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1]| givenRoles[3] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[3] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1]| givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[4] 
| givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[6]) | (givenRoles[8])  ) 
 
-- DSOD for Leader Roles 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[4] -> AG !(givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[3] | 
givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[5] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[2] | givenRoles[7] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[6] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
 227 
 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[6] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[3] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[7]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
SPEC AG ( givenRoles[7] -> AG !(givenRoles[0] | givenRoles[1] | givenRoles[2] | 
givenRoles[4] | givenRoles[5] | givenRoles[6]) | (givenRoles[8]) ) 
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